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LOWLY but surely the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial is be-
ing eroded as social media invades the jury room.' Essential eviden-
tiary rules control what jurors can learn about a case and what they
can say about it during a trial. In just a decade, the rapid growth of easy
online communication has threatened to dissolve the protective walls that
have been built around the jury. The key question is whether judges can
now persuade jurors to resist the siren call of online communication when
they serve as jurors. Judges cannot ignore this problem.
The juror who turns to social media and either intentionally seeks, or is
inadvertently exposed to information pertaining to the trial no longer re-
lies on just the evidence presented in the courtroom. The juror who uses
social media to express his or her views of the case no longer appears to
be impartial. Although some jurors in the past might have violated the
judge's instructions not to discuss the case with family or friends, the ju-
ror who disregards the judge's instructions today by using the Internet or
social media reaches a far wider audience and receives far more media
attention than a juror who spoke just to family members. The juror who
turns to social media or the Internet to reveal his or her views calls into
question the fairness of the jury trial.
* Professor of Law and Director of the Justice John Paul Stevens Jury Center, IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. I am grateful to Mark L. Karno and Jeffrey A. Parness, who
organized the 2012 Allerton Conference at Starved Rock, Illinois and invited me to serve
as a panelist on "Social Media and Internet Use by Jurors During Civil Trials." That con-
ference gave me the opportunity to hear judges' and lawyers' growing concerns about ju-
rors and social media. I appreciate the comments I received when I presented drafts of this
paper at various workshops and conferences, including a "research slam" at Chicago-Kent
College of Law, an Academics Workshop at the ABA Criminal Justice Section Sixth An-
nual Fall Institute in Washington, D.C., the Association for the Study of Law, Culture and
the Humanities Conference at the University of Virginia Law School, and the Criminal
Justice Colloquium held at Southern Methodist University's Dedman School of Law. I
thank Meghan Ryan and Jenia lontcheva Turner for organizing such a wonderful gathering
at SMU and the SMU Law Review for publishing the papers from the Colloquium. I give
special thanks to Sam Castree for his research assistance, Clare Willis for her library assis-
tance, and Gwendolyn Osborne for keeping me up-to-date on media coverage of jurors
and social media.
1. I will be referring to both "social media" and "the Internet" throughout this Arti-
cle, even though I will sometimes use one term or the other as a shorthand for both. Both
terms describe online forms of communication that provide users with easy access to a vast
repository of information and to a vast audience of users.
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Although newspaper headlines recount some of the more egregious ex-
amples of jurors using social media or the Internet to obtain information
that is unreliable or inappropriate for the jury to consider,2 the scope of
the problem is difficult to assess. The few empirical studies that have been
done to date have serious limitations. 3
Judges feel the need to take action, but in the face of limited empirical
evidence, they have not been sure what to do. A common response has
been to revise the cautionary instruction in an effort to make it clear to
jurors that they need to refrain from using the Internet and social media
to communicate about the trial.4 A few courts have gone so far as to ban
jurors from having electronic devices in the courtroom and jury room,5
but this response does not address the problem that jurors will have ac-
cess to these devices when they go home at night.
Having jurors refrain from using the Internet and social media will
likely grow harder in the years ahead and will require taking what I call a
"process view" of a juror's education. The "process view" recognizes that
at every stage at which the court interacts with jurors, there is an oppor-
tunity to educate them. From start to finish-from jury summons to jury
verdict-there are opportunities for the court to educate jurors about the
need to avoid online communication about the trial.
The education of a juror begins with the jury summons and ends when
the jury announces its verdict and the judge polls the jury and dismisses
it. Although the summons and dismissal constitute the two end points,
there are several points of interaction between court and juror through-
out the process including the jury orientation video, voir dire, the oath,
preliminary instructions, as-needed instructions, final instructions, juror
questions, and the polling of jurors. Each stage provides an opportunity
for the judge to educate jurors about their need to refrain from using the
Internet and social media to communicate about the trial.
A process view of a juror's education will be effective for most, but not
all, jurors. A comprehensive education should transform "uninformed ju-
rors" into "informed jurors." Admittedly, it will not reach "recalcitrant
jurors." For recalcitrant jurors, who have no intention of following the
prohibition, the best hope is for judges and lawyers to find new ways to
identify and remove them during voir dire. If recalcitrant jurors do man-
age to avoid detection during voir dire, then it is up to fellow jurors to
spot them when they violate the prohibition and to report them to the
judge.
This Article explores what it means to take a process view of a juror's
education in order to protect parties' constitutional rights to a fair trial. It
proceeds in six parts. Part II considers why it is important that the jury
reaches its verdict based only on the evidence presented in the court-
2. See infra Part IV.A.
3. See infra Part IV.C.
4. See infra Part V.A.
5. See infra Part V.B.
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room. Part III explains how jurors' use of the Internet and social media,
whether to do research or to share their views, interferes with a fair trial.
In Part IV, I explore the extent of the problem by reviewing and evaluat-
ing the empirical studies that have been conducted to date. Even though
the empirical evidence is scant, it is necessary for judges and courts to
take action. If they wait, there might be lasting damage to the jury. In
Part V, I describe the steps that courts have taken thus far, which tend to
be isolated efforts.
In Part VI, I explain why courts and judges need to take a process view
of a juror's education, which utilizes judge-jury interactions as opportuni-
ties to educate jurors about the need to resist online communication
about the trial. Judges must repeat the message and repeat it in a variety
of ways so that jurors understand why they must resist online communica-
tion about the trial. In Part VII, I anticipate likely responses to my propo-
sal. "Uninformed jurors" will appreciate this approach because it will
transform them into informed jurors, whereas "recalcitrant jurors" will
remain unmoved by it. Judges should embrace this proposal because it is
flexible and they can tailor it as they see fit. Most important, it is likely to
be effective, and judges need an effective approach because it is their
responsibility to ensure that the parties receive a fair trial.
II. PROVIDING A FAIR TRIAL
The Sixth Amendment6 provides a criminal defendant with the right to
a jury trial in serious cases,7 and the Seventh Amendment8 provides a
party with the right to a jury trial in certain types of civil cases in federal
court.9 Although these amendments speak only in terms of a "trial," im-
6. The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
7. Although the Sixth Amendment provides a defendant with the right to a jury trial
in "all" criminal cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this right to mean in all
"serious" criminal cases. See, e.g., Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543-44
(1989) (assuming for purposes of the Sixth Amendment that an offense carrying a maxi-
mum prison term of six months or less is a "petty" offense for which there is no right to a
jury trial); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1970) (establishing that a defendant is
entitled to a jury trial whenever the offense for which he is charged carries a maximum
prison term of more than six months); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968)
("[T]here is a category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amend-
ment jury trial provision . . . .").
8. The Seventh Amendment provides in relevant part: "In Suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved ..... U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
9. The Supreme Court has never held that the Seventh Amendment is applicable to
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc.,
518 U.S. 415, 418 (1996) ("[Tjhe Seventh Amendment ... governs proceedings in federal
court, but not in state court . . . ."); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974) (noting
that the Supreme Court "has not held that the right to jury trial in civil cases is an element
of due process applicable to state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment"); see also
GTFM, LLC v. TKN Sales, Inc., 257 F.3d 235, 240 (2d Cir. 2001) ("The Seventh Amend-
ment has not, however, been applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment
and hence does not require that jury trials be held in proceedings in State tribunals.").
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plicit in the notion of a trial is a "fair trial." If one were entitled only to
the form of a trial, but not to a fair trial, then the protection would be of
little value. However, a jury trial is recognized as the best protection that
our legal system can provide a criminal defendant.10 Indeed, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has recognized the jury trial as so "fundamental" to our
system of criminal justice that it has extended it to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment."
The right to a fair trial also has roots in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.12 In a number of opinions, the U.S.
Supreme Court has identified several features of a fair trial, which in-
clude: notice, an opportunity to be heard, an opportunity to present and
to cross-examine witnesses, an impartial decision-maker, a statement of
reasons based on the evidence, and representation by counsel in criminal
cases.'3
One requirement for a fair trial is that the decision-maker should de-
10. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965) ("Trial by jury has been estab-
lished by the Constitution as the 'normal and ... preferable mode of disposing of issues of
fact in criminal cases.' . . . [T]he mode itself has been surrounded with safeguards to make
it as fair as possible . . . .") (citation omitted).
11. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 ("Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is
fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which-were they to be tried in a fed-
eral court-would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee."). Justice White, who
wrote the Court's opinion in Duncan, described the jury trial as fundamental to preventing
"oppression by the Government" by providing the criminal defendant with an "inestimable
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased,
or eccentric judge." Id. at 155-56. He also wrote the Court's opinion in Taylor v. Louisi-
ana, in which he used similar language to describe why the right to jury trial is fundamental
to the American criminal justice system: "The purpose of a jury is to guard against the
exercise of arbitrary power-to make available the commonsense judgment of the commu-
nity as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the
professional or perhaps over-conditioned or biased response of a judge." Taylor v. Louisi-
ana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
12. The Due Process Clause provides in relevant part: "[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..... U.S. CONsT.
amend. XIV, § 1. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment's equal
protection component to include the same due process protections as the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 680 n.5 (1973) ("[W]hile the
Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is
'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process."') (quoting Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S.
163, 168 (1964)).
13. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) ("The rights to confront
and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have long been rec-
ognized as essential to due process."); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967) ("Due
process . . . requires that [the defendant] be present with counsel, have an opportunity to
be heard, be confronted with witnesses against him, have the right to cross-examine and to
offer evidence of his own. And there must be findings adequate to make meaningful any
appeal that is allowed."); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) ("A person's right to rea-
sonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a
right to his day in court-are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include,
as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be
represented by counsel."); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (identify-
ing similar requirements for due process in parole violation hearings).
620 [Vol. 67
2014] Jurors and Social Media: Is a Fair Trial Still Possible?
cide the case based only on the evidence presented at trial.1 4 One reason
for this is so that only evidence that satisfies certain indicia of reliability
will be considered.15 Another reason is so that the evidence can then be
tested through cross-examination.16 Yet another reason is so that all of
the decision-makers-jurors and judge alike-have considered the same
evidence, and in the case of jurors, can deliberate about what they have
seen and heard, and ultimately reach a consensus about how to interpret
it. In addition, in accordance with the Sixth Amendment,1 7 the Seventh
Amendment,' 8 and the Due Process Clause,19 a fair trial requires the de-
cision-makers to be impartial and to withhold judgment until the trial has
ended.
A. THE EVIDENCE Is PRESENTED IN COURT
One reason that a fair trial requires a jury to reach a verdict based only
on the evidence presented in court is so that the evidence is as reliable as
possible. The rules of evidence try to ensure that the information that will
be presented to the decision-maker meets a certain modicum of reliabil-
ity.2 0 To be admitted into evidence, a document, photograph, or other
object must withstand a level of scrutiny that we typically do not demand
of such objects in our daily lives.21 For example, for a photograph to be
admitted into evidence in federal court, it must be relevant,22 more pro-
bative than prejudicial, 23 the original24 (unless it fits under one of the
exceptions for using a duplicate),25 and withstand any objections by the
other side. If the photograph meets all of these requirements, it can ulti-
mately be introduced as evidence in court. The attorney introducing the
photograph will try to make the strongest arguments possible to show it
supports his or her client's case, and the attorney on the other side will try
to chip away at those arguments and reveal their weaknesses.
Similarly, if the evidence is going to be offered in the form of testi-
14. See, e.g., Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 429 (1969) ("The right to present
evidence is, of course, essential to the fair hearing required by the Due Process Clause.").
15. See, e.g., Chambers, 410 U.S. at 298 ("Out-of-court statements are traditionally
excluded because they lack the conventional indicia of reliability .... ).
16. See, e.g., id. (identifying cross-examination as one of the "conventional indicia of
reliability" of evidence).
17. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI (requiring "an impartial jury").
18. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) ("The American tradition of trial by
jury, considered in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily con-
templates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community.").
19. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (noting that "the minimum
requirements of due process" in parole violation hearings include "a 'neutral and detached'
hearing body").
20. See FED. R. EVID. 102.
21. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 1001, 1002, 1004 (rules governing the requirement of an
original).
22. See FED. R. EVID. 402.
23. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
24. See FED. R. EVID. 1002.
25. See FED. R. EVID. 1001(e), 1004.
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mony, then the witness must appear in court,26 take an oath or affirma-
tion,27 and have personal knowledge as a lay witness 28 or expertise as an
expert witness.29 Then the witness must testify and be subjected to cross-
examination by the other side, albeit limited to the subject matter raised
during direct examination.30 In a criminal trial, the right of the defendant
to confront witnesses is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 31 In both
criminal and civil trials, the rules that govern a witness's testimony try to
ensure that the testimony is reliable.32 The testimony is elicited in a for-
mal manner through a series of questions and answers. The jury can then
decide whether it believes the witness, not just based on the words spo-
ken but on the entire presentation: How did the witness appear? Did the
witness give responses that seemed credible? Did the witness's body lan-
guage underscore or undermine his or her words? In a typical instruction,
the judge will later explain to the jurors that it is up to them to decide
how credible they found a witness's testimony:
You are the only judges of the credibility of the witnesses. You will
decide the weight to be given to the testimony of each of them. In
evaluating the credibility of a witness, you may consider that witness'
ability and opportunity to observe, memory, manner, interest, bias,
qualifications, experience, and any previous inconsistent statement
or act by the witness concerning an issue important to the case.33
B. THE EVIDENCE Is TESTED THROUGH CROSS-EXAMINATION
After the evidence has met the basic threshold of reliability and has
been admitted, it can be further scrutinized through cross-examination.
Each side can introduce evidence that it believes bolsters its case, and the
other side's task is to find weaknesses in that evidence and to expose the
weaknesses through cross-examination. Whether the evidence takes the
form of an exhibit or testimony, the adversarial process is designed to
reveal the strengths and weaknesses of the evidence.
26. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing a defendant the right to confront witnesses
and to call witnesses in his favor).
27. See FED. R. EVID. 603. A typical oath is: "You and each of you, do solemnly swear
that you will well and truly try the cause now pending before this Court, and a true verdict
render therein, according to the evidence and the instructions of the Court, so help you
God?" CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL TRIAL JUDGES' DESKBOOK 356 (Ronald
M. George ed., 1988).
28. See FED. R. EVID. 602.
29. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
30. See FED. R. EVID. 611(b).
31. The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . .. to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . ." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
32. See FED. R. Civ. P. 43; FED. R. CRIM. P. 26; FED. R. EVID. 602.
33. ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES,
ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL §1.01[51 (2011 ed.) [hereinafter 2011 IPI].
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C. THE EVIDENCE Is AVAILABLE TO ALL DECISION-MAKERS
Another reason for the evidence to be presented in court is so that it is
available to all of the decision-makers. In a jury trial, if all of the jurors
have seen the evidence in the courtroom and have heard the lawyers' and
witnesses' competing interpretations as to what the evidence shows, then
the jurors can discuss the evidence with each other during deliberations.
Jurors, having all seen or heard the evidence, will be on equal footing and
will be able to add their own views as to what they think the evidence
shows. The parties will have the benefit of all of the jurors' input.
It is also important for the judge to have seen and heard the evidence
in the courtroom. 34 Although the jury's acquittal in a criminal case is not
subject to judicial review, the jury's conviction in a criminal case is subject
to a motion for a judgment of acquittal35 or a motion for a new trial,36
which the trial judge decides in the first instance. The defendant also can
appeal a judgment of conviction.37 Thus, it is important for there to be a
record, based on the evidence presented in court, that appellate judges
can review. Similarly, in a civil case, the losing party can move for judg-
ment as a matter of law3 8 or a new trial39 and can eventually seek review
by an appellate court. Again, it is important for the jury to have relied
only on the evidence presented in court and for the trial judge to have
seen and heard the same evidence so he or she can decide any motions
based on it, including motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a
new trial. The evidence presented in court also will be part of the trial
record for appellate review. 40
Anytime jurors look at information outside of the evidence presented
at trial, it raises questions about the reliability of that information. Such
information would not have gone through the testing prescribed by the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Such information would not have been subject
to the scrutiny afforded by cross-examination. Such information would
not be available to all of the decision-makers-jurors and judges alike.
Perhaps this is one reason that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which
generally prohibits a judge from inquiring into the reasoning that a jury
34. Stephen Yeazell explained that when early juries could undertake their own inves-
tigations outside of the courtroom, they were able to exercise power that was beyond the
judge's control because the jurors had information that the judge lacked. See Stephen C.
Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 87, 91. Even-
tually, judges limited juries' power by requiring juries to base their verdicts only on the
evidence presented in court. Id. at 93. Yeazell explained this change as part of the increas-
ing professionalization of judges and lawyers and the concomitant development of rules of
evidence in the eighteenth century. Id. at 93-96. As a result, "judges developed the rule
that evidence on which the jury based its verdict must have been received in open court;
the jury could no longer 'know' things not presented at trial." Id. at 93.
35. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c)(2)-(3). The defendant can also move for a judgment of
acquittal after the government has presented all of its evidence. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a).
36. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33.
37. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(j) (Defendant's Right to Appeal).
38. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)-(b).
39. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
40. FED. R. App. P. 10(a)-(b).
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used to reach its verdict, permits a judge to inquire as to whether the jury
considered any extraneous material during its deliberations. 41 Such extra-
neous material would not have been subject to the review provided by
the rules of evidence and cross-examination. Not surprisingly, the intro-
duction of such extraneous material can result in a mistrial.4 2 Whether
that extraneous material comes from the brick-and-mortar world or the
virtual world, it has the same deleterious effect: it interferes with the right
to a fair trial.
D. THE DECISION-MAKERS NEED To BE IMPARTIAL
Another requirement of a fair trial is that the decision-makers are im-
partial. This requirement applies to jurors and judges alike. The Sixth
Amendment explicitly provides that the defendant has a right to "an im-
partial jury" in a criminal trial.4 3 The Supreme Court has interpreted the
Seventh Amendment to require an impartial jury in a civil trial as well. "
Because there is no one definition of what it means for a juror to be
impartial, judges have explained this concept to jurors in different ways.
For example, one judge explained during voir dire that jurors should not
have a "slant one way or another in this case." 45 In other words, jurors
should be able to enter the courtroom and believe that they can decide
the case either way. Throughout the trial, the judge will instruct the jurors
not to form any view of the case. For example, in California, the trial
judge typically admonishes the jury as follows: "Please remember all my
admonitions to you; do not discuss the case amongst yourselves, form any
opinions about the case, conduct any deliberations until the matter has
been submitted to you, do not allow anybody to communicate with you
with regard to the case." 4 6
Lawyers and judges explain that the purpose of voir dire is to deter-
mine whether a prospective juror can be impartial. 47 They believe this
can be achieved by having the judge, and sometimes the lawyers, ask the
prospective juror a number of questions that are intended to reveal any
41. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (limiting judicial inquiries into jury deliberations to the
question whether "extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's
attention" or whether any "outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any
juror").
42. See, e.g., Russo v. Takata Corp., 774 N.W.2d 441, 443 (S.D. 2009).
43. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to be tried before
an "impartial jury." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
44. See Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) ("The American tradition of trial
by jury, considered in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily con-
templates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community.").
45. Transcript of Voir Dire at 70, 74, 83, 89, 91, 98, 112, United States v. Torres, No. 77
Cr. 680 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1980).
46. 231 Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Wed., Sept. 27, 1995, at 47,792, People v.
Simpson (Cal. Super. Ct. 1995) (No. BA097211).
47. Voir dire serves other purposes as well. See Nancy S. Marder, Batson Revisited, 97
IOWA L. REv. 1585, 1610-11 (2012) (describing other purposes of voir dire, including
"teaching jurors about their proper role and helping them to make the transition from
citizens to jurors").
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bias-either bias that rises to the level of a for cause challenge 48 or bias
that leaves the lawyer with sufficient misgivings that he or she removes
the juror through the exercise of a peremptory challenge. 4 9 The jurors
who are ultimately seated on the petit jury are those who have gone
through voir dire questioning and were not removed because of hardship
or challenges. The goal is to seat jurors who have undergone a certain
amount of screening and soul-searching and who believe that they can be
impartial, and who have convinced the judge, lawyers, and parties that
they can be impartial.
The judge, too, needs to be impartial. A judge who cannot satisfy the
requirement of impartiality has a statutory50 and ethical obligation5 ' to
recuse himself or herself from the case. If a judge fails to do so, a party
can file a motion seeking the judge's recusal.52 Although the trial judge is
able to decide such motions in the first instance, a denial is subject to
appellate review. One reason that judges' and jurors' impartiality is so
important is so that they can decide the case based only on the evidence
presented at trial and not be led astray by personal biases. Another rea-
son is so that the parties and public believe that the proceedings have
been fair.
III. SOCIAL MEDIA'S INTERFERENCE WITH A FAIR TRIAL
There are a number of ways in which a juror's use of social media dur-
ing the trial or deliberations can interfere with the parties' right to a fair
trial and the public's acceptance of the verdict. The juror who turns to
social media and either intentionally seeks or is inadvertently exposed to
information pertaining to the trial no longer relies on just the evidence
presented in the courtroom. The juror who uses social media to express
his or her views of the case while the trial is ongoing no longer appears to
be an impartial juror. Although some jurors in the past might have vio-
lated the judge's instructions to avoid discussing the case with anyone,
including family or friends, the juror who does so today using social me-
dia reaches a far wider audience and receives much more attention than
48. Judges have discretion whether to remove a juror for cause. Traditionally, the rea-
sons to grant a for cause challenge are that the juror has a financial or familial connection
to the parties, or the juror says that he or she cannot be impartial. See Hopt v. Utah, 120
U.S. 430, 432-33 (1887).
49. See FED. R. Civ. P. 47(b); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012) ("Any justice, judge, or mag-
istrate . . . of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.").
51. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(A) (2003) ("A judge shall respect
and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confi-
dence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.").
52. See, e.g., Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (hold-
ing that a judge who is black and female should not recuse herself from a case involving sex
discrimination); Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F.
Supp. 155, 156-57, 181-82 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (holding that a black judge should not have to




the juror who spoke to his or her family members. In so doing, the juror
who turns to social media to reveal his or her views or queries about the
trial calls into question the fairness of the trial.
A. OUTSIDE RESEARCH
One way that jurors have used today's social media,53 such as Facebook
and Twitter, is by seeking information that pertains to the trial and that
has not been presented in the courtroom. Jurors might seek this informa-
tion out of good motives, such as a desire to understand the law, the facts,
or the procedure better than they do, but rather than turning to the court
for this information, they turn instead to social media. For example, ju-
rors might want to learn more about the parties or lawyers, and so they
immediately go to Google or Wikipedia. Or jurors might not understand
an expert witness's description of a technical procedure, so they immedi-
ately go to a website for further clarification. Or jurors might not under-
stand all of the legal procedures, so they "tweet" their question to their
followers on Twitter.
Although jurors might have always had questions during trials, they did
not always have the tools or easy access to information that they now
have. A layperson might not have known where to begin legal research
when cases could only be found in bound volumes of reporters in law
libraries. The information was available in specialized books and libraries,
but one had to have legal training to know what to look for as well as how
to look for and understand it. Thus, before the Internet and social media,
the information was publicly available, but "practical[ly] obscur[e]," 54 at
least to the layperson.
In contrast, today, information that jurors might consider useful for the
trial is immediately available and understandable. Jurors have access to
this information from their smartphone, tablet, or laptop, just to name a
few devices that provide easy access to the Internet and social media re-
gardless of one's location. Even if jurors are in a courtroom that bans
such devices, they will have access to them once they leave the court-
room. No longer does one need a dictionary or an encyclopedia to check
the meaning of a word or the details of a technical procedure; no longer
53. I recognize that "social media" is ever changing and that today's social media is
unlikely to be tomorrow's social media. For example, MySpace was popular for a while, but
quickly fell out of favor and was replaced by other social media such as Facebook and
Twitter. See, e.g., Katherine Rushton, Twitter Value Drops £5bn on Fears for Future, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 7, 2014, at B1 ("The slowdown stoked fears that Twitter will
struggle to increase its revenues as rapidly as hoped, and that it could fall out of favour,
echoing the decline of social networks such as MySpace and Bebo."). I will use "social
media" broadly to include crowdsourcing of any type-from today's popular social media,
such as Facebook, Twitter, and FourSquare, to online exchanges, such as blogging and
Wikipedia entries.
54. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
761-62 (1989) (considering whether information collected by a government agency about
an individual can be obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request by a third
party or whether the individual's privacy interest protects that information from public
disclosure).
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does one need to go to the site of an accident to understand more about
what might have happened. Now one has access to all of this information
and much more at one's fingertips. Google, Wikipedia, and Google Street
View provide answers to all these questions. In addition, one has access
to a network of individuals who have specialized knowledge that once
was available only if you happened to know such an expert. Lawyers,
doctors, forensic specialists, and other experts are all available on Twitter,
Facebook, or blogs, to name just a few such sources. They can respond to
queries whether you know them personally or not.
One difficulty is that the information from social media is not reliable.
Although it may be reliable enough for choosing a restaurant for dinner,
it is not reliable enough for deciding to convict a defendant or to assess
liability against a party. A Wikipedia entry, for example, may explain a
subject about which a juror has a question, but who wrote this crowd-
sourced entry, and how accurate or complete is it?55 The information
available through social media has not been tested in the ways that infor-
mation admitted into evidence at trial has been tested. It does not have to
meet any of the threshold requirements of the rules of evidence, and it is
not tested through the adversarial process. Nor is it available to all of the
jurors, the parties, and the judge.
B. INADVERTENT EXPOSURE
Another difficulty is that jurors might not seek information about the
trial when they go online, but they might be exposed inadvertently to it
when they check their Twitter account or email. If there is a lot of media
coverage of the trial then there is likely to be a lot of discussion about the
trial on social media. Some of that discussion will include information
that is speculative, incorrect, or inappropriate for jurors to consider.
For example, jurors are not told about a defendant's past crimes. 56 This
type of information is intentionally kept from them because of the all-
too-human tendency to think that if someone has committed a crime in
the past, then he probably committed the crime with which he has now
been charged. Jurors might like to know this information, but it is infor-
mation that is intentionally withheld from them.57 It is regarded as preju-
dicial information and likely to lead jurors to incorrect conclusions.58
55. As the Fourth Circuit noted, even Wikipedia acknowledges that "'[a]llowing any-
one [sic] to edit Wikipedia means that it is more easily vandalized or susceptible to un-
checked information."' United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 650 (4th Cir. 2012) (cita-
tions omitted). The Fourth Circuit noted that "the open-access nature of Wikipedia" meant
that "the danger in relying on a Wikipedia entry is obvious and real." Id. In Lawson, the
Fourth Circuit, after weighing several factors, set aside the jury's verdict and concluded
that a juror's use of Wikipedia to look up a word used by the statute violated "the funda-
mental protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 651.
56. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). However, such evidence can be used for other purposes,
such as proof of "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, ab-
sence of mistake, or lack of accident." Id.




Thus, the protections that are built into the trial process are thwarted
when jurors are exposed to information that they are not supposed to
consider.
Although the possibility of inadvertent exposure existed before social
media, coverage was less pervasive and more readily avoided. For exam-
ple, newspapers and newsmagazines might contain coverage of a trial, but
jurors could be told to avoid reading them, or to read only versions from
which articles about the trial had been expunged. Similarly, television
news coverage was limited to a few television stations and a few time
slots, and jurors could easily avoid the coverage. However, with the ad-
vent of social media, the discussion is round-the-clock and references to a
trial can pop up anywhere.
C. APPEARANCE OF PARTIALITY
Those jurors who use social media to convey their views of a trial while
the trial or deliberations are in progress undermine the requirement that
the case has been decided by an impartial jury. Jurors who use social me-
dia to give their views of a trial, such as announcing "the defendant is
guilty" midway through the trial, have formed an opinion and publicly
expressed it even though they are supposed to keep an open mind. Jurors
have agreed during voir dire that they can be impartial throughout the
trial and have taken an oath that they will decide the case based only on
the evidence. 59 Yet their comments often reveal that they have reached a
conclusion before the evidence has been fully presented. Even jurors who
offer online comments that are less conclusive, such as "Why does the
judge allow the lawyers to speak for so long?" or "I am bored," suggest
that they are not taking the proceedings seriously and undermine the re-
spect that the public and parties are likely to have for the jury and its
verdict.
Jurors who convey their views of a trial or deliberations on social me-
dia also create another problem because they are supposed to share their
views only with their fellow jurors; they are not supposed to share their
views with anyone outside of the jury room.60 One reason for this prohi-
59. See CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL TRIAL JUDGES' DESKBOOK, supra
note 27, at 356 (providing a typical oath).
60. See Transcript of Proceedings, People v. Simpson, supra note 46, at 47,792 (quoting
Judge Ito's admonition to jurors). Even those courts that have experimented with permit-
ting jurors to engage in predeliberation discussions have limited those exchanges to the
jurors only and have instructed them that they can only have such deliberations if all jurors
are present. See B. Michael Dann & George Logan III, Jury Reform: The Arizona Experi-
ence, 79 JUDICATURE 280, 281 (1996) (describing Arizona's jury reforms including telling
jurors that they can discuss the evidence before the close of a trial in a civil case). Two
studies of the effectiveness of this rule in Arizona found that jurors did not always wait
until all jurors were present to have such preliminary discussions, even though they had
been instructed to do so. See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Discussions During Civil
Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIz. L. REv. 1, 75 (2003) (describing one
study in which fifty jury deliberations were videotaped and finding that the juries that had
been instructed that they could engage in predeliberation discussion "when all jurors were
present . .. frequently ignored this admonition and many substantive discussions occurred
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bition is so that no outsider tries to influence them. The jury is supposed
to reach its own independent judgment free from outsiders' influence,
tampering, or extraneous information. 61 Also, if jurors express their views
to outsiders, it becomes even more difficult for jurors to back down from
those views later when they are in the midst of deliberations. Jurors are
supposed to reach a group decision through robust deliberations. They
are supposed to listen carefully to each other's arguments and to decide if
they find them persuasive. If they do, they should be willing to vote ac-
cordingly. One reason for the secrecy of the deliberations is so that jurors
can be candid with each other. If one of the jurors expresses his or her
views or reactions to other jurors' views online, then it is difficult for the
other jurors to feel that they can speak candidly. Who knows what will
end up online?
D. MAGNIFIED HARMS
Although jurors have always confronted these problems, social media
makes the harms more likely and magnifies their reach. Admittedly,
there has always been the danger that a juror would do his or her own
research or consult an outside source. Social media merely exacerbates
this problem. Today, information is easy to obtain. It does not involve a
journey to a library or a visit to a site. Everything can be done online.
Information is available just by typing in a search term. It is a lot easier to
violate the judge's instruction and to consult outside sources or to do
outside research when one can do it from one's home or even from one's
smartphone. In fact, it no longer feels like "outside" research; rather, it
merely feels like what one does anytime one needs additional informa-
tion. The response to check information on one's cell phone-whether to
answer a question, define a term, or check a fact-has become almost
second nature to many people.
Similarly, it is easy for jurors to be exposed inadvertently to informa-
tion via social media. It pops up everywhere, including where one least
expects it. Checking one's personal email account might mean exposure
to recent headlines. Updating one's Facebook page might mean learning
about new developments in the trial for which one is serving as a juror.
Even benign activities might lead to information that one is not supposed
to have.
Although judges have long instructed jurors that they are not to discuss
the case with anyone, including friends or family, judges have long sus-
pected that some jurors do, but the harm from such conversations is mini-
mal. In the age of social media, however, if a juror offers his or her views
when a sizeable number of the jurors were not present in the jury room"); Paula Hanna-
ford-Agor et al., Permitting Jury Discussions During Trial: Impact of the Arizona Reform,
24 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 359, 364, 376, 379-80 (2000) (reaching a similar finding based on
questionnaires from jurors rather than coding of videotaped deliberations).
61. See supra Part II.A-D.
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online, those views can go viral and be read by millions of people. 62 In
addition, those views can be picked up by traditional media and aired
round-the-clock. The damage can be considerable. A large number of the
public may then find it hard to believe that the juror who revealed his or
her views has approached the case with an open mind. The ideal of a fair
trial has then become endangered.
IV. DETERMINING THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM
It is difficult to know how many jurors use social media in impermissi-
ble ways while they serve as jurors. There are several sources of informa-
tion, but they do not give a complete picture.63 There are the high-profile
examples that grab newspaper headlines, and there are a number of re-
ported cases when courts have found that jurors used social media or the
Internet in a manner that constituted juror misconduct. 64 There have also
been a few empirical studies in this country and abroad to examine how
prevalent the use of social media is by jurors; however, each study has its
own limitations. 65 In spite of the paucity of empirical studies, many state
and federal courts have felt the need to take action. 66
A. NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS
One of the early newspaper headlines first calling attention to the
problem of jurors who use social media or the Internet to do research on
issues that arose during trial was As Jurors Turn to Web, Mistrials Are
Popping Up. 6 7 The article reported that a federal judge, presiding over a
trial involving drugs in Florida, interviewed one juror who admitted that
he had done research on the Internet about the trial, in violation of the
judge's instructions.68 Even more startling, the judge soon discovered that
eight other jurors on that same jury had engaged in similar wrongdoing. 69
Jurors had conducted Google searches to learn about the lawyers and
defendant; they had checked definitions on Wikipedia; and they had
62. According to one lawyer who moderated an ABA panel on social media and jurors
on August 3, 2012, "'There are currently 955 million Facebook users, and that figure is
expected to rise to one billion this month,' [Hayes] Hunt [of Cozen O'Connor, Philadel-
phia] said. Twitter has 500 million users, he added." Lance J. Rogers, ABA Panelists Ex-
plore Intersection of Social Media and Criminal Justice System, 91 CRIM. L. REP. 653
(2012).
63. See infra Part IV.A-C.
64. See infra Part IV.A-B.
65. See infra Part IV.C.
66. One researcher at the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) explained the
difficulty that researchers face in advising courts: "'Until we know how and why jurors use
information, we can't advise judges' about jury instructions or other strategies to address
this issue . . . ." #notweets@juryservice, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS 6 (2011), http://
www.ncsc.org/-/media/Files/PDF/Annual%20Reports/AnnualReport20ll.ashx (quoting
Nicole Waters, NCSC senior court research associate).
67. John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Web, Mistrials Are Popping Up, N.Y. TIMES,
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searched for evidence that had been excluded from the trial by the
judge. 70 The judge felt he had no choice but to declare a mistrial.7 ' The
article dubbed the problem "a Google mistrial." 72
Newspapers are replete with other high-profile examples in which ju-
rors engaged in online communication or research about a trial. NBC's
Today Show weatherman, Al Roker, got into trouble when he took
photos of prospective jurors in the jury lounge and posted them on Twit-
ter.73 A juror on a capital murder case conducted online research as to
the nature of the victim's injuries, leading to her dismissal from the jury
and resulting in a retrial of the defendant on lesser charges. 74 In a civil
case in which a juror looked up the female defendant on Facebook and
sought to "friend" her, the judge removed the juror from the jury.75 Af-
terward, however, the juror updated his Facebook page to say how glad
he was to have "got[ten] out of jury duty." 76 At that point, the judge
scheduled a hearing to consider contempt-of-court charges against the ju-
ror.77 In a similar case, a juror in Texas ultimately pleaded guilty to four
counts of contempt of court and was sentenced to two days of community
service for trying to friend the defendant.78
Although the headlines might report on the most egregious examples
because the media relies on such stories to attract an audience, it is also
possible that this misconduct is far more prevalent than anyone suspects.
One article in 2010 tried to give some idea of how widespread jurors' use
of the Internet was. 7 9 It noted that a Reuters' search of Westlaw "found
90 verdicts [had been] called into question since 1999" due to jurors' use
of the Internet, and "[m]ore than half the cases [were] from the last two
years [2008-2010]."80 Reuters also monitored Twitter posts for three
weeks in November and December 2010 and found that people who iden-




73. Debra Cassens Weiss, Media Atwitter over Al Roker's Twitter Photos from Jury
Duty Wait, A.B.A. J. (May 29, 2009, 9:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/mediaat
witterover alrokerstwitter.photosfrom jury.duty-wait.
74. See Brian Grow, U.S. Juror Could Face Charges for Online Research, REUTERS,(Jan. 19, 2011, 1:11 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/19/us-internet-juror-idUST
RE7015K120110119.
75. Ben Zimmer, Juror Could Face Jail Time for 'Friending' Defendant, USA TODAY




78. Eva-Marie Ayala, Tarrant County Juror Sentenced to Community Service for Try-
ing to 'Friend' Defendant on Facebook, STAR-TELEGRAM (Aug. 28, 2011), http://www.tdcaa
.com/issues/tarrant-county-juror-sentenced-community-service-trying-friend-defendant-
facebook.
79. Debra Cassens Weiss, At Least 90 Verdicts Challenged Because of Jurors' Alleged






B. CASE LAw EXAMPLES
There have also been a number of judicial opinions that found juror
misconduct based on jurors' use of social media or the Internet while they
served as jurors.82 Although these cases, like the newspaper accounts,
provide instances of juror misconduct, they cannot capture how wide-
spread the problem is.
One type of juror misconduct found in these cases is when jurors use
the Internet to do their own research in violation of the requirement that
they decide the case based only on the evidence presented in court.83 For
example, in Tapanes v. State, in which the defendant was tried for first-
degree murder but was convicted of the lesser included offense of "man-
slaughter with a firearm," the foreperson used his smartphone to look up
"prudent" and "prudence," which were words that the prosecutor had
used repeatedly during closing argument. 84 The foreperson then shared
the definitions with his fellow jurors.85 The misconduct did not come to
light until after the jury reached a verdict.86 The appellate court ruled
that the definitions could have influenced the verdict and remanded the
case for a new trial.87
In an earlier case, Russo v. Takata Corp., the juror conducted a Google
search before voir dire, though he did not reveal his search during voir
dire.88 He wanted to find out whether the defendant had ever been
sued.89 He concluded from his Google search that Takata had not been
sued before.90 He did not reveal this information to the other jurors until
jury deliberations when he told them that he had not found any indica-
tion of past lawsuits against Takata. 91 The trial judge found that the ju-
ror's research constituted "extrinsic evidence" that was prejudicial and
granted a new trial.92 The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
trial judge's ruling, though it stated it was not announcing a "hard and
fast rule that all such types of internet research by a juror prior to trial
without notice to the court and counsel automatically doom a jury's
verdict."93
81. Brian Grow, As Jurors Go Online, U.S. Trials Go Off Track, REUTERS (Dec. 8,
2010, 3:23 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/08/us-internet-jurors-idUSTREGB
74820101208.
82. See, e.g., Russo v. Takata Corp., 774 N.W.2d 441, 454 (S.D. 2009); Tapenes v. State,
43 So. 3d 159, 163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
83. Tapanes, 43 So. 3d at 162.
84. Id. at 160, 162.
85. Id. at 162.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 163.
88. Russo v. Takata Corp., 774 N.W.2d 441, 443-44 (S.D. 2009).
89. Id. at 446.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 447.
93. Id. at 454.
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There also have been cases of jurors posting their views about the trial
using social media while the trial is still proceeding.94 Such disclosures
violate the trial judge's instructions and impugn the integrity of the trial.
For example, in Dimas-Martinez v. State, a capital murder case, one of the
jurors continued to post messages about the trial to his Twitter account,
even after the judge had told him to stop.9 5 The juror persisted even dur-
ing the penalty phase, when he tweeted: "Choices to be made. Hearts to
be broken." 96 The Arkansas Supreme Court held that "the circuit court's
failure to acknowledge this juror's inability to follow the court's direc-
tions was an abuse of discretion." 97
In some of these cases, the juror's posts gave the impression that the
juror had already formed an opinion in the case while the trial was still
proceeding. For example, in Commonwealth v. Guisti, a juror sent an e-
mail to a listserv containing 900 subscribers98 in which she said that she
was "'stuck in a 7 day-long Jury Duty rape/assault case. . . missing impor-
tant time in the gym, working more hours and getting less pay because of
it! Just say he's guilty and lets [sic] get on with our lives!"' 99 The State
had only presented three of its six witnesses when the juror had sent her
e-mail.100 Even if the juror had not specifically stated that she thought the
defendant was guilty, she suggested that she was willing to vote that way
just to be done with her jury service. Even if she were advocating that the
jury vote based on expediency rather than a fully formed point of view,
the result would be the same for the defendant: a conviction. However,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was more concerned about
whether the juror had received any responses to her e-mail, and if so,
whether she shared those responses with her fellow jurors. 101 Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case for the trial judge to
conduct a limited voir dire to address those concerns.102
C. EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
There have been a few empirical studies to date, but they provide only
a limited view of the scope of the problem. One of the earliest reports on
jurors' use of social media came from a question that was included in a
broad study of juries conducted by Cheryl Thomas at the request of the
94. See Dimas-Martinez v. State, 385 S.W.3d 238, 242 (Ark. 2011).
95. Id. at 240, 242.
96. Id. at 246.
97. Id. at 248.
98. See Tricia R. Deleon & Janelle S. Forteza, Is Your Jury Panel Googling During the
Trial?, ADVOC., Fall 2010, at 36, 38.
99. Commonwealth v. Guisti, 747 N.E.2d 673, 678 (Mass. 2001). This juror's desire to
rush a verdict because of her own personal schedule recalls the situation of Juror 7, the
marmalade salesman, in the movie 12 Angry Men. He had tickets for the baseball game
that evening and did not want to miss a moment of it. Thus, he was in favor of a speedy
resolution (i.e., conviction) so that he could get to the ball game on time. See 12 ANGRY
MEN (Orion-Nova Productions 1957).
100. Guisti, 747 N.E.2d at 678.
101. See id. at 679-80.
102. Id. at 681.
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U.K. Ministry of Justice.103 Her research project examined how fair jury
trials were in England and Wales, but one of her research questions in-
cluded the following: "How is the internet affecting jury trials?" 104 Her
research utilized three different methods: a case simulation using actual
juries at Crown Courts (797 jurors on 68 juries); a large-scale analysis of
all jury verdicts (68,000 verdicts) in Crown Courts in England and Wales
that concluded between October 1, 2006 and March 31, 2008; and a post-
verdict survey of jurors (668 jurors in 62 cases) in three locations in En-
gland (London, Nottingham, and Winchester). 0 5 She relied on the first
method to determine whether all-white juries discriminated against black
or minority defendants.106 She used the second method to examine
whether there was consistency in jury verdicts. 07 Finally, she relied on
the third method to explore jurors' use of the Internet during the trial.'08
With respect to the Internet, judges instructed jurors not to look on the
Internet for information about their trial.109 Using post-verdict question-
naires, Thomas asked jurors whether they had looked for information on
the Internet, and if so, where they had looked.110 The jurors completed
the questionnaires anonymously."' Thomas found that in high-profile
cases, 12% of jurors indicated that they had looked for information on
the Internet, whereas in ordinary cases, 5% of jurors indicated that they
had done so.11 2 In both types of cases (high-profile and ordinary), a much
higher percentage of jurors indicated that they had come across media
reports of their case on the Internet (26% of jurors in high-profile cases
and 13% in ordinary cases) than jurors who admitted that they had
looked for media reports of their case on the Internet (12% of jurors in
high-profile cases and 5% in standard cases).113 This result is not surpris-
ing given that jurors had to admit to having done something that they had
been instructed not to do by the judge. What was surprising, though, was
that most jurors who indicated that they had looked for information on
the Internet (68%) were over thirty years old.114 Although the conven-
tional view is that younger jurors-the so-called "digital natives"-are
more likely to turn to the Internet for information, this was not the case
in Thomas's study.
Admittedly, the focus of Thomas's study was on the fairness of the jury
trial in England and Wales, especially as it might be affected by race, so
103. See Cheryl Thomas, Are Juries Fair?, JUSTICE i, viii (Feb. 2010), http://www.justice
.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-analysis/moj-research-are-juries-fair-research
.pdf.
104. Id. at i.
105. Id. at i, ii.
106. Id. at i.
107. Id. at ii.
108. Id. at viii.
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her examination of jurors' use of the Internet was only a small part of the
study.115 As Thomas acknowledged, many questions with respect to ju-
rors' use of the Internet remain unanswered from her study, including
which sources jurors turn to on the Internet, how they use these sources,
and whether they really understand that they are not supposed to use the
Internet and social media during the trial.116
The main weakness of Thomas's approach was that jurors were asked
to self-report. 117 One problem with self-reporting is that jurors' recollec-
tions can be faulty or self-serving. 18 Another problem is that they were
asked to self-report about a matter that was contrary to the judge's in-
structions. 119 Even though they were granted anonymity, the percentages
are likely to be lower than the actual percentages because jurors are un-
likely to admit to wrongdoing. Thomas does not indicate where these ju-
rors completed the post-verdict questionnaires, but if they completed the
questionnaires in the courthouse that might have left them feeling even
more reticent about admitting to wrongdoing than if they had completed
them in their own homes. In addition, this study was conducted in En-
gland and Wales, and though there are many similarities between their
jury system and ours, there are also differences that need to be consid-
ered before the results of a study in one country are applied to a jury
system in another country.120
One of the earliest studies in the United States on jurors and the "new
media" 121 was made public in August 2010 by the Conference of Court
Public Information Officers (CCPIO), the National Center for State
Courts (NCSC), and the E.W. Scripps School of Journalism at Ohio Uni-
versity (CCPIO study).122 The CCPIO study, like Thomas's study, did not
have jurors' use of social media as its main focus. Rather, the CCPIO
study looked primarily at judicial officers' use of technology in the courts
and considered how this new media affected court proceedings, the con-
duct of judges and court employees, and public understanding of and
trust in courts.123 In terms of method, the study used an online survey
that it invited 16,000 individuals to complete between June 16 and June
115. See generally id. (devoting only a few pages of the larger study to juror use of the
Internet).
116. Id. at 44.
117. See id. at 12.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 43.
120. See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder, Two Weeks at the Old Bailey: Jury Lessons from En-
gland, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 537, 576-83 (2011).
121. By "new media," this study meant social media (such as Facebook, MySpace, and
Linkedln), microblogging (such as Twitter), smartphones, tablets, and notebooks (such as
iPhone and Blackberry), sites that aggregate information (such as Google's Social Search),
news categorizing, sharing and syndication (such as blogs and RSS), visual media sharing
(such as YouTube and Flickr), and Wikis. See Conference of Court Public Information
Officers, et al., New Media and the Courts: The Current Status and a Look at the Future 8-9
(Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.ccpio.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/2010-ccpio-report.pdf
[hereinafter CCPIO study].
122. Id. at 1.
123. Id. at 8.
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25, 2010.124 In the end, 810 individuals (of which 254 were judicial of-
ficers) completed the questionnaire. 125 Federal judges were not included
in this study.126
With respect to jurors' use of social media, the main finding of the
CCPIO study was that only 9.8% of judicial officers (judges, administra-
tive judges, or magistrates) witnessed jurors' use of social media sites,
microblogging, smartphones, tablets, or notebooks in the courtroom.127
Although the authors found that this percentage (9.8%) reflected a
"smaller proportion of judges than might be expected,"128 it is not so sur-
prising given that the authors asked judges to respond to what they had
observed in the courtroom. The difficulty with that charge is that judges
have many responsibilities in the courtroom. Their attention will un-
doubtedly be focused on a number of different trial participants, and as a
result, they will be unable to focus exclusively on jurors and their use of
social media. Thus, jurors could use social media in the courtroom, but
not be observed by judges. Alternatively, judges might take time to ob-
serve jurors in the courtroom, but the problem might be that jurors use
the new media outside of the courtroom. They could use it in the deliber-
ation room, at lunch, or at home, and such usage would not have been
observed by judges or captured by this study. Another methodological
limitation of this study is that the survey was conducted online and sent to
a distribution list.12 9 This means that only those judicial officers who are
technologically savvy were likely to complete the online survey and that
the respondents were not randomly selected.
A 2011 study by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC study) filled some of
the gaps left by the CCPIO study.130 The FJC study's central focus was an
assessment of how frequently jurors in federal district courts used social
media to communicate during the trials.' 3 ' The FJC study polled active
and senior federal district court judges.132 The FJC study, like the CCPIO
study, used an online questionnaire and asked judges to report on their
perceptions of jurors' use of social media to communicate about the pro-
ceedings in which they were involved.133 Of the 952 judges who received
124. Id. at 9.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 10. A small survey, conducted at about the same time as the CCPIO study by
an academic and sent to federal judges, prosecutors, and public defenders, of whom about
40 responded, found that "[a]pproximately ten percent of the respondents reported per-
sonal knowledge of a juror conducting Internet research." Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Google,
Gadgets, and Guilt: Juror Misconduct in the Digital Age, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 409, 415 n.39
(2012).
128. CCPIO study, supra note 121, at 10.
129. Id. at 65.
130. Meghan Dunn, Jurors' Use of Social Media during Trials and Deliberations: A Re-
port to the Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Management,
FED. JUD. CTR. (Nov. 22, 2011), https://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dunnjuror.pdf/
$file/dunnjuror.pdf [hereinafter FJC study].
131. Id. at 1.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2.
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the questionnaire, 508 responded; thus, there was a relatively low re-
sponse rate of 53%.134
The key finding of the FJC study was that "[t]he use of social media by
jurors during trials and deliberations is not a common occurrence. "l35
Only 6% of the responding judges (30 out of 508) encountered jurors
who used social media during the trial or the deliberations.13 6 Further-
more, most of these judges (twenty-eight out of thirty) who indicated that
jurors used social media said that this had happened in only one or two
trials and that it was more common in criminal trials (twenty-two judges)
than in civil trials (five judges).' 37 However, three judges indicated it hap-
pened in both civil and criminal trials.138 Judges acknowledged that it was
difficult for them to observe jurors using social media, and those who
reported that jurors used social media mainly discovered the usage when
other jurors reported it to them (thirteen judges).139 According to this
study, most of the federal district court judges have taken some measures
to ensure that jurors do not use social media during the trial and delibera-
tions.140 The most common approach is for judges to use the federal
model instruction (60% of the responding judges) or some other instruc-
tion (67% of the remaining judges) to inform jurors that they cannot use
social media during the trial or deliberations.141
Although the FJC study provides a window into federal district court
judges' approaches to stopping jurors from using social media during the
trial or deliberations, it too has limitations. One limitation, as the FJC
study acknowledged, is that it looked at federal judges' perceptions of
jurors' use of social media, but it cannot provide any information as to
jurors' actual use of social media.142 Another limitation is that it only
looked at federal district court judges' perceptions and did not include
state court judges. 143 In addition, the FJC study, like the CCPIO study,
used an online questionnaire.14 4 As a result, the responding judges might
be those who are more technologically savvy, and therefore, more able to
observe jurors' use of social media in the courtroom than judges who
have little knowledge of technology, including social media. Even though
the FJC study found that only a small percentage of judges observed ju-
rors using social media, the percentage might have been even smaller if
the responding judges were reached through online as well as paper ques-
tionnaires and included both technologically savvy and technologically
unsophisticated judges.
134. Id. at 1.




139. Id. at 4.
140. Id. at 5.
141. Id. at 6-7.
142. Id. at 2.




The strikingly small number of judges who indicated that jurors used
social media suggests that this is not something that judges can readily
observe. This point is reinforced by the judges, who said that they relied
mainly on other jurors to bring this behavior to their attention. One con-
clusion that some readers might draw from this study is that few jurors
are using social media since only 6% of the judges (30 out of 508) indi-
cated that a juror had done so in only one or two trials over which the
judge presided.145 However, another conclusion-and the one that I
think is more likely-is that judges are unable to observe this behavior
for a variety of reasons, including the judges' need to focus on other as-
pects of the trial and the fact that jurors could engage in such behavior
outside of the courtroom and beyond the gaze of the judge. As a result,
we should not turn to judges in order to assess how widespread the prob-
lem is. Of course, the less technologically savvy judges-who might well
be the ones who did not respond to this questionnaire-would have an
even more difficult time detecting this behavior because they might not
even know what they should be trying to observe. Yet another problem in
turning to judges for this information is that they are likely to believe that
jurors are adhering to this instruction just like they are supposed to ad-
here to all the judge's instructions. Thus, judges might be resistant to the
notion that some jurors are flouting the judge's instructions.
A 2012 study undertaken by Judge Amy St. Eve, a federal district court
judge in the Northern District of Illinois, also found little evidence of
jurors' use of social media in two judges' courtrooms and jury rooms.146
In this study, as in the earlier studies, there are design features that might
account for this finding. Judge St. Eve, along with her law clerk, con-
ducted an "informal study," which they described as "not scientific."147
Over the course of sixteen months, Judge St. Eve, along with Judge Mat-
thew Kennelly, another federal district court judge in the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois, had 140 actual jurors complete a short survey after the
jurors had finished their jury service. 148 The jurors came from sixteen tri-
als (criminal and civil) held in the Northern District of Illinois and pre-
sided over by these two judges.149 Both judges gave the federal model
instruction on social media at the beginning and end of each trial, and
repeated it throughout the trial, especially during long trials. 50 This in-
struction informs jurors that they are not to use social media or the In-
ternet to learn more about the case or to share their views during the trial
and the deliberations.' 5
145. Id. at 2.
146. See Hon. Amy J. St. Eve & Michael A. Zuckerman, Ensuring an Impartial Jury in
the Age of Social Media, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 21 (2012).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 20-21.
149. Id. at 21.
150. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 199-202 (describing the federal model
instruction in further detail).
151. St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 146, at 26-28.
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The central finding that emerged from this survey was that only 6 out
of 140 jurors reported any temptation to communicate about the case
using social media, and all 6 claimed not to have succumbed to the temp-
tation.152 The key lesson from this survey, according to the authors, is
that courts should routinely and repeatedly instruct jurors on the need to
avoid communicating about the trial using social media. 15 3 They con-
cluded that the survey shows that jurors will follow the judge's instruc-
tions.154 The study reaffirmed, in Judge St. Eve's words, "'the fact that
jurors do follow our instructions."' "155
Although jurors do try to follow a judge's instructions, especially in-
structions that are as easy to understand as this one is, there are a few
other reasons why all of the jurors might have claimed to have followed
the instruction even if some of them had not. First, this study involved a
small number of participants (140) coming from only two courtrooms.
Second, and most significant, this was a judge-conducted survey, which
means that there is a chance that the jurors were not being completely
candid. Of course, there is always a risk when jurors have to answer a
questionnaire about their actions that they are not being completely can-
did. However, there is an even greater risk here because the jurors were
aware of the following: the judge or law clerk administered the survey;
the judge had instructed the jurors not to use social media or the Internet;
and the jurors presumably completed the survey in the courtroom where
they had just served. For these reasons, they might have been less candid
than usual in their responses. They might have feared-even though the
survey was conducted anonymously-that they would get in trouble if
they admitted to having engaged in behavior contrary to the judge's
instructions.
In 2014, Judge St. Eve and her former law clerk, aided by Judge
Charles Burns, a judge in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois,
Criminal Division, expanded and updated the 2012 survey.'56 Judge St.
Eve and Judge Burns, using jurors who served in trials in their respective
courtrooms, added 443 responses to the 140 responses collected in the
earlier study.'57 Both judges used a model social media instruction during
opening and closing instructions, and at various points throughout the
trial in some of the longer trials.' 58
From the 583 juror responses in both studies, they found that the over-
whelming number of jurors (520 or 89.19%) were "not tempted" to and
did not use social media.159 Of the small number of jurors (47 or 8.06%)
152. Id. at 21.
153. See id. at 24-25.
154. See id.
155. Ameet Sachdev, Poll: Jury Directive Effective on Leaks, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 16, 2013,§ 2 (Business), at 1.
156. Hon. Amy J. St. Eve, Hon. Charles P. Burns & Michael A. Zuckerman, More from
the #Jury Box: The Latest on Juries and Social Media, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 64 (2014).
157. Id. at 78.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 79.
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who were tempted to use social media, 45 said they did not succumb to
temptation, and the other 2 did not respond.160 The percentages of jurors
who were "not tempted," "tempted," or from whom there was "no re-
sponse" were about the same for federal and state court jurors. 161
The authors found from the juror comments that jurors refrained from
using social media to discuss the trial-whether they had been tempted or
not tempted to do so-mainly because of the judge's instructions. 1 6 2 The
oath also influenced their behavior. 163 Twenty jurors indicated that they
had not been tempted to use social media during the trial because they do
not use social media at all, and other jurors were not tempted out of fair-
ness to the parties. 164 The authors, while acknowledging that their follow-
up study was also "informal" and "not scientific," 1 6 5 provided a snapshot
view of the reasons jurors gave for following the law. The authors con-
cluded that the cautionary instructions are effective as long as they ex-
plain to jurors why it is important to refrain from online communication
about the trial, and as long as the instructions are given at the beginning
and end of the trial and at various points throughout the trial.166 The
lesson the authors drew from their survey is that "[c]ourts should instruct
juries on social media early and often." 167
This survey, like the earlier one, was based on jurors' questionnaires,
which jurors were asked to complete by a judge in the courtroom after
the judge had instructed them not to communicate online about the
trial.168 It is not surprising that few jurors were willing to admit to temp-
tation, much less having succumbed to temptation. Although the jurors
were protected by anonymity, they still might have felt uneasy about ad-
mitting to misconduct or even having contemplated misconduct. In addi-
tion, the survey used the word "tempted" ("Were you tempted to
communicate about the case through any social networks, such as
Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, YouTube or Twitter?"), which reminded
the jurors that they should not have engaged in the action about which
they were being asked. 169 Instead, the question should have been phrased
more neutrally, such as: "Did you consider communicating about the case
through any social networks, such as Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, You-
Tube or Twitter?"
In spite of these limitations, the study provided "the voices of actual
jurors" and the reasons they gave for their behavior. 70 These reasons
supported the view that most jurors take their responsibilities seriously
160. Id. at 79-80.
161. Id. at 80.
162. Id. at 80, 83.
163. See id. at 84.
164. Id. at 84-85.
165. Id. at 66.
166. See id. at 88-90.
167. Id. at 87.
168. Id. at 78.
169. Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
170. Id. at 66.
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and try to do a good job. In addition, this 2014 study added to the earlier
2012 study by including state court jurors and by increasing the total
number of participants.171
The National Center for State Courts (NCSC) completed a pilot study
in which prospective jurors, jurors, and alternates responded to a survey
about social media; judges and attorneys completed surveys about the
cases as well.17 2 The pilot study was limited in scope in that participants
came from the courtrooms of only six judges in six criminal trials and
seven civil trials located in five states.173 The authors acknowledged that
the pilot study was small but also pointed out that the average juror re-
sponse rate of 97% in criminal trials and 70% in civil trials was high.174
The preliminary findings revealed that most of the judges in this study
instructed jurors about what they could and could not do with respect to
the Internet, and most prospective jurors understood this instruction.175
About 66% of the prospective jurors recognized that any Internet re-
search would violate the judge's instructions, and 87% of the prospective
jurors said that using the Internet to communicate with friends, family, or
others about the trial would violate the judge's instructions.17 6 About
86% of prospective jurors said they could refrain from communicating on
the Internet during the trial, if instructed by the judge to do so, whereas
the remaining 14% said they would be unable to do so.177
The key question raised by the NCSC pilot study was whether jurors
and alternates would admit to misconduct involving the Internet.178
About 10% of jurors and alternates admitted to misconduct but only to
the "old-fashioned" kind, such as having predeliberation discussions with
fellow jurors and talking about the trial with family members. 179 The re-
luctance of jurors to admit to misconduct involving the Internet led the
authors of this pilot study to recommend a "dual-track" approach when
the NCSC conducts a national study. 80 One track would employ the
same methodology as the pilot study, and the other track would try to
follow up with former jurors, while making sure that the jurors could not
be linked to the case on which they served.18' The hope is that through
one track or the other, jurors would be forthcoming about their use of
social media or the Internet to communicate or do research about the
trial.
171. Id.
172. Paula Hannaford-Agor, David B. Rottman & Nicole L. Waters, Juror and Jury Use
of New Media: A Baseline Exploration, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTs 4, available at
http://www.ncsc.org/-/media/Files/PDF/Services%20and%2Experts/Harvard%2Execu
tive%20Session/jurorandjuryuse.aspx (last visited Aug. 27, 2014).
173. Id.
174. Id.









V. COURTS' RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM THUS FAR
Judges face a conundrum. They cannot know the full extent of jurors'
use of social media, and yet, there are serious constitutional conse-
quences to judicial inaction. Thus far, the empirical studies are few in
number and limited in approach.182 One researcher sensibly observed:
"'Until we know how and why jurors use information, we can't advise
judges' about jury instructions or other strategies to address this issue
. . . ."183 Yet individual instances of juror misconduct grab headlines and
result in mistrials.184 The individual instances attract widespread atten-
tion and raise questions-for parties, lawyers, judges, and the public-
about the fairness of trials and the legitimacy of jury verdicts. Thus,
judges need to take action, even in the face of limited empirical evidence
as to scope and how best to proceed.
In this Part, I identify steps that judges have tried thus far to prevent
jurors from using social media and the Internet during trials and delibera-
tions. Some judges have suggested that the courts need not respond. 85
They assume that jurors' use of social media or the Internet today is no
different than jurors' discussions of the trial with family or friends in an
earlier era. 186 Other judges, however, believe that a response is necessary
and have usually agreed to one or two discrete steps.'87 The most com-
mon response has been to update the cautionary instruction.' 8 A more
extreme response has been to ban all electronic devices in the court-
house.189 The most extreme response, which has been reserved for the
most egregious misconduct, has been to subject the juror to contempt
proceedings and to impose sanctions.190
A. INSTRUcrIONS
Judges' most common response to try to stop jurors from using social
media and the Internet has been to give a revised cautionary instruc-
tion.191 Initially, many judges thought that the cautionary instruction that
had often been used, which told jurors not to seek information about the
trial from any outside sources, such as newspapers, magazines, television,
and radio, and not to talk to anyone about the trial, including family and
182. See, e.g., id. at 6, 9-10.
183. #notweets@juryservice, supra note 66, at 6 (quoting Nicole Waters, NCSC senior
court research associate).
184. See supra Part IV.A.
185. See Grant Amey, Social Media and the Legal System: Analyzing Various Responses
to Using Technology from the Jury Box, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 111, 122 (2010).
186. See id.; Andrea F. Siegel, Judges Confounded by Jury's Access to Cyberspace, BAL-
TIMORE SUN (Dec. 13, 2009), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2009-12-13/news/bal-md.ar
.tmil3decl3 1_deliberations-period-florida-drug-case-jurors.
187. See Dunn, supra note 130, at 10.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 11.
190. See id. at 5; see also Michael K. Kiernan & Samuel E. Cooley, Juror Misconduct in
the Age of Social Networking, 62 FDCC Q. 179, 189 (2012), available at http://www.the
federation.org/documents/v62n2_Kiernan.pdf.
191. See Dunn, supra note 130, at 10.
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friends, and not to do any outside research about the trial, was broad
enough that jurors would know that they could not do research on the
Internet or communicate about the trial through social media. 192 Some
judges also argued that merely mentioning the Internet and social media
websites in an instruction would entice jurors to go to websites that they
would not have gone to on their own and that by naming some websites
and not others, jurors would think that the named websites were the only
websites they could not use.19 3
However, jurors did not necessarily know that doing a Google search
or finding information on Wikipedia constituted outside research.194 They
did not view an online search from a smartphone or a laptop as doing
outside research. After all, they were not going to a library or consulting
an expert. 195 Rather, they were simply turning to Google or Wikipedia,
which is what they do whenever they have a question in their private or
professional lives, and what they assumed they could do as jurors.196 Sim-
ilarly, when a juror shared his or her views about the trial on Facebook or
sent a quick tweet about it on Twitter, they were not "discuss[ing]" the
case with friends or family;197 they were simply updating their friends
about their day's activities on Facebook or sharing their impressions with
their followers on Twitter.
The growing number of media stories recounting instances of jurors'
improper use of the Internet and social media made it clear to some
judges that the language typically found in the earlier cautionary instruc-
tions did not convey to jurors what judges thought it did. A number of
state pattern jury instruction committees198 and the federal committee' 99
rewrote their cautionary instruction to be more specific than in the
past.200 As the Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration
and Case Management (CACM) explained, the idea is that "more explicit
mention in jury instructions of the various methods and modes of elec-
tronic communication and research would help jurors better understand
192. See Amey, supra note 185, at 122-23.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 114; Siegel, supra note 186.
195. See Siegel, supra note 186.
196. See Schwartz, supra note 67.
197. 2011 IPI, supra note 33, § 1.01[8] (prohibiting jurors from discussing the case with
anyone).
198. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 186 ("Concern has grown so much nationwide that
legal experts, including in Maryland, are rewriting model jury instructions to specifically
tell jurors that online searches, texting and social media-the things they routinely do on
laptops, cell phones and BlackBerrys-are out."). Some of the states that were quick to
revise their jury instructions to address social media and the Internet included California,
Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Washington. See Posting of Jeannine
Turgeon, jturgeon@dauphinc.org, to PJILIST@Listserv.ncsconline.org (Nov. 21, 2011) (on
file with author).
199. See Judicial Conference Comm. on Court Admin. and Case Mgmt., Proposed
Model Jury Instructions: The Use of Electronic Technology to Conduct Research on or





and adhere to the scope of the prohibition against the use of these de-
vices." 201 The state and federal committees have revised their respective
instructions so that the instructions mention the Internet and social media
explicitly and give examples, such as Google, Wikipedia, and Twitter, as
sources that cannot be turned to for information or an exchange of
views.202
For example, Illinois's preliminary cautionary instruction in civil trials
did not tell jurors to avoid doing outside research until 2009.203 In 2009,
the preliminary cautionary instructions in civil trials informed jurors that
they could not do outside research about the trial, learn about the trial
from outside sources, such as press, radio, television or the Internet, 204 or
use "cell phones, text messaging, Internet postings and Internet access
devices in connection with [their] duties" as jurors.205 In January 2011,
the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions in Civil
Cases206 revised its preliminary cautionary instruction so that it was more
specific and included several examples:
For example, you must not use the Internet, [including Google,]
[Wikipedia,] [(insert current examples)], or any other sources that
you might use every day, to search for any information about the
case, or the law which applies to the case, or the people involved in
the case, including the parties, witnesses, lawyers, and judge. 207
In addition, the Illinois preliminary cautionary instruction in civil trials
now informs jurors that they are not to share their thoughts or views
about the case with anyone using any means at all, including "posting
information about the case, or your thoughts about it, on any device or
Internet site, including [blogs,] [chat-rooms,] or [(insert current exam-
201. Committee Suggests Guidelines for Juror Use of Electronic Communication Tech-
nologies, THIRD BRANCH (Apr. 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/10-
04-O1/CommitteeSuggestsGuidelines-forJurorUseofElectronicCommunication_
Technologies.aspx (quoting Federal District Court Judge Julie A. Robinson's transmittal
letter).
202. See id.
203. The IPI book published in 2006 did not contain any references to outside research
in the preliminary cautionary instruction (§ 1.01); nor did the supplements published in
2007 or 2008. Compare ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN
CIVIL CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 1.01 (2006 ed.), with ILL.
SUPREME COURT COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES, ILLINOIS PAT-
TERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 1.01 (Supp. 2007), and ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM.
ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS-CIVIL § 1.01 (Supp. 2008). However, the supplement published in 2009 did contain
references to outside research. See ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON PATTERN JURY IN-
STRUCTiONS IN CIVIL CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 1.01[6]-[7]
(Supp. 2009) [hereinafter 2009 IPI].
204. 2009 IPI, supra note 203, § 1.01[7].
205. Id. § 1.01[6].
206. In the interest of full disclosure, I serve as the Professor/Reporter for this Commit-
tee, and have held this position since October 2003. Thus, I have firsthand knowledge of
the changes to the IPI preliminary cautionary instruction.
207. 2011 IPI, supra note 33, § 1.01 [7]. The judge can decide which material to include
if it appears in brackets. This instruction also contains a bracket with a note to the judge to
add current examples.
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pies)], or any social-networking websites, such as [Twitter], [Facebook] or
[(insert current examples)], or any other means." 208 The committee pro-
vided a note to its readers (judges and lawyers) indicating that the judge
should update the list to accommodate developments in technology, web-
sites, and social media. 209 The committee that drafts the criminal jury in-
structions in Illinois eventually followed suit, though its instruction is not
as specific as the version used in civil jury trials.210
Ohio's revised instruction went a step further than Illinois's and most
other states' instructions. In addition to specifying that jurors are not to
use the Internet and social media to communicate about the trial,211 the
Ohio cautionary instruction explains to jurors that they cannot use any
legal information that they have gleaned from television shows, movies,
or other forms of entertainment:
The effort to exclude misleading outside influences also puts a limit
on getting legal information from television entertainment. This
would apply to popular TV shows such as Law and Order, Boston
Legal, Judge Judy, older shows like L.A. Law, Perry Mason, or Mat-
lock, and any other fictional show dealing with the legal system. ...
You must put aside anything you think you know about the legal
system that you saw on TV.2 1 2
The aim of Ohio, Illinois, and other states that have updated their cau-
tionary instruction was to use plain language and to give specific exam-
ples, so that jurors understand precisely what they need to refrain from
doing. Linguists and plain language proponents have long urged jury in-
struction committees to write in language that is particular rather than
general.213 Jury instruction committees finally took this advice to heart
when revising their instructions to explain to jurors that they could not
use the Internet or social media to do research or to share their views.214
The revised pattern cautionary instructions typically include a list of
208. Id. § 1.01 [9].
209. Id. § 1.01 (Notes on Use) ("For any of the cautionary instructions that refer to
particular forms of technology, such as 1.01 [7], [9] and [10], judges should feel free to add
new examples as they become available.").
210. The preliminary cautionary instruction in criminal cases in Illinois was revised on
July 13, 2012. See ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL
CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 1.01A (2014).
211. The Ohio instruction is also explicit that there is to be no outside contact, including
"sending or receiving e-mail, Twitter, text messages or similar updates, using blogs and chat
rooms, and the use of Facebook, MySpace, Linkedln, and other social media sites of any
kind regarding this case or any aspect of your jury service during the trial." OHIO STATE
BAR Ass'N JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., OSBA JURY INSTRUCTIONS § I.C.4 (2010) [here-
inafter OSBA JURY INSTRUCTIONS].
212. Id. § I.C.3.
213. See, e.g., Peter Tiersma, The Rocky Road to Legal Reform: Improving the Lan-
guage of Jury Instructions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1081, 1115-16 (2001) (recommending the
use of defendant's name rather than "defendant" in jury instructions, though the task force
did not follow the recommendation). For a fuller exposition of plain language principles,
see Joseph Kimble, The Elements of Plain Language, MICH. B.J., Oct. 2002, at 44.
214. See Committee Suggests Guidelines for Juror Use of Electronic Communication
Technologies, supra note 201.
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sources that are intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive, and advise
judges that they should update the list based on new developments in
technology and communication. 215
B. BANNING ELECTRONIC DEVICES
Another approach that some courts have taken is to ban all electronic
devices from the courtroom and jury room. 2 1 6 The idea is that if jurors do
not have access to their electronic devices, such as smartphones and
laptops, during the trial and deliberations, then they will be unable to go
online, at least when they are in the courthouse.
This approach has several limitations. The most serious limitation is
that unless the jurors are sequestered, they will be able to go online once
they leave the courthouse and return home every night. Thus, the ban is
only effective for a limited amount of time, and meanwhile, the court
runs the risk of alienating jurors. Jurors are likely to find it inconvenient
to be without their electronic devices. They cannot stay in touch with
their home or workplace even during long breaks in the trial. In addition,
they might resent the ban, which seems punitive, and the inconvenience,
which seems unnecessary. Thus, the ban is likely to prove ineffective, and
even worse, lead jurors to feel resentful.
Some courts have banned electronic devices in the courthouse as a se-
curity measure to keep gang members from intimidating witnesses, but
have excluded jurors from that ban and have had jurors simply turn off
their devices when they are in the courtroom.217 Other courts have de-
cided that they do not have the space or security personnel to store peo-
ple's electronic devices and have decided that banning electronic devices
is not practical, particularly in a busy, urban courthouse. 218
C. CONTEMPT, FINES, AND SHAMING
Jurors who have violated the court's instruction and caused a mistrial
have sometimes found themselves the subject of contempt proceedings,
215. See id.
216. See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 130, at 9.
217. Circuit Chief Judge Timothy Evans announced a ban, which was to take effect on
January 14, 2013, on all devices "capable of connecting to the Internet or making audio or
video recordings" in all criminal courts in Cook County. Jason Meisner, Judge Bans Elec-
tronics from Cook Courthouses, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 2012, at C8. Chief Judge Evans ex-
plained that the ban was intended to stop gang members from intimidating witnesses,
spectators, or victims by taking pictures of them when they were in the courtroom. Id. The
ban exempts current and former judges, licensed attorneys, law enforcement officers, gov-
ernment employees, news reporters, and members of the public reporting for jury duty. Id.
Implementation of the ban was delayed until April 2013. Jennifer Delgado, Electronic De-
vices To Be Banned From Court: County Officials Faced with Stopping Those with Phones,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 12, 2013, at C5.
218. Chief Judge James F. Holderman explained that this was the position taken by the
federal district court judges in the Northern District of Illinois. See Panel Discussion, Social
Media and Internet Use by Jurors During Civil Trials, Allerton Conference (Apr. 12, 2013)
(notes on file with author).
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resulting in fines,219 or on rare occasions, jail time. Judges have taken
these punitive measures when jurors have deceived the court, such as by
lying during voir dire, or when they have gone online notwithstanding
repeated instructions and warnings from the judge.220 When jurors have
so clearly flouted the inherent power of the court, judges have used puni-
tive measures as a last resort.221
One of the more unusual sanctions involved a judge who punished a
juror, who had violated her oath, by removing her from the jury and re-
quiring her to write a five-page essay about the right to a fair trial as
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.222 The ju-
ror had posted on Facebook that it was "gonna be fun to tell the defen-
dant they're GUILTY" while the trial was ongoing.223 The essay was a
unique punishment.
The difficulty with punitive measures is that they do not alleviate the
problem except perhaps by serving as a deterrent to other jurors who
might be tempted to engage in such misconduct. Moreover, punitive mea-
sures entail a high cost to the judicial system. Contempt proceedings and
retrials require time and money. Perhaps even more harmful in the long
run, they place jurors and judges in an antagonistic, rather than a cooper-
ative, relationship.
D. MAVERICK APPROACHES
Aside from the most common response, which is to have the judge give
an instruction, and the more extreme measures, which include bans, con-
tempt proceedings, and fines, there are a few judges and courts that have
experimented with maverick approaches. For example, one jury consult-
ant advised judges to eschew the boilerplate language of a pattern in-
struction and to explain, in their own words, why it is so important for
jurors to resist the temptations of the Internet and social media.224 One
judge asked prospective jurors during voir dire whether they would be
able to adhere to an instruction about avoiding communication about the
trial on the Internet and social media.225 Another judge has gone a step
further and requires jurors to take the affirmative act of signing a state-
219. Dunn, supra note 130, at 5.
220. See, e.g., Ed White, Juror Hadley Jons Punished for Posting Verdict on Facebook,





224. Twittering in the Jury Box, A.B.A. LITIG., Summer 2009, at 13 ("advis[ing] judges
to fully explain the restriction against jurors discussing and reading anything about their
case rather than simply reciting boilerplate jury instructions") (quoting Douglas L. Keene,president of the American Society of Trial Consultants).
225. See, e.g., Deleon & Forteza, supra note 98, at 38, 39 (quoting Judge Craig Smith,from the 192nd Judicial District Court in Dallas County, Texas, who suggested that attor-
neys should "ask questions about potential juror[s'] use of the Internet, including partici-
pating in networking sites like Twitter and Facebook").
647
SMU LAW REVIEW
ment in which they agreed that they will abide by the instruction. 226 In
Washington State, the judges have displayed a poster in the jury rooms. 227
It instructs jurors: "Do not receive or send electronic communications
about the case" and "Avoid outside information from the Internet or
other sources," among other rules.2 2 8 Some federal district courts have
added the Washington State poster to federal jury deliberation rooms. 229
In Massachusetts, the Commission of Jurors included a segment in the
juror orientation video, which is also available online, that warns jurors to
avoid the Internet and social media.230 In Michigan, Judge Don Shelton
created a video in which he gives his standard admonition telling jurors
that they cannot do outside research or have outside communications
while they are serving as jurors, but he also takes the time to explain why
this rule exists and what will happen if it is violated.231 Although these
creative efforts are encouraging, they are usually one-shot efforts under-
taken on an individual basis.
What is needed is an approach, which I describe in the next Part, that is
comprehensive and tries to educate jurors at every step in the jury pro-
cess and that reaches jurors through a variety of mediums-written
words, spoken words, and images. This approach, which I describe as tak-
ing a process view of a juror's education, recognizes that jurors learn how
to perform their role at every stage of the jury trial, and not just through
instructions often delivered only once during the trial. Jurors need to be
engaged in the jury process at every step of the way, and they need to feel
that they can have their questions answered by the judge rather than by
resorting to self-help measures, such as social media and the Internet.
This approach also assumes that most jurors want to perform their role
responsibly and simply need to be educated as to what is acceptable or
unacceptable behavior.
226. Judge Shira A. Scheindlin in the Southern District of New York required jurors in
a criminal case "'to sign a pledge not to research the case on the internet and warned them
that they would face perjury charges if they broke the agreement."' Rogers, supra note 62,
at 655.
227. Gabriell Butler, Federal Judges, Courtroom Posters Say "No" to Social Media, 95
JUDICATURE 240, 240 (2012).
228. See E-mail from Rick Neidhardt, Reporter, Wash. Pattern Jury Instruction Comm.
to Pattern Jury Instruction List [PJILIST] (Nov. 21, 2011) (on file with author) (providing
.pdf of poster).
229. Butler, supra note 227, at 240.
230. See E-mail from Paula Hannaford-Agor, Dir., Ctr. for Jury Studies, Nat'l Ctr. for
State Courts, to Pattern Jury Instruction List [PJILIST] (May 9, 2012) (on file with author).
The online version of the video is available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/jury/index2.htm
(the link to the video is under "Jury Information" and "Videos").
231. Jury Selection, Trial and Deliberations: Research Guide, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, http://www.ncsc.org/topics/jury/jury-selection-trial-and-deliberations-resource-
guide.aspx (last visited Aug. 27, 2014) (video can be found about two-thirds of the way
down the page).
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VI. TAKING A PROCESS VIEW OF A JUROR'S EDUCATION
Having jurors refrain from using the Internet and social media while
they are serving as jurors is a challenge that is likely to grow harder in the
years ahead and requires a solution that takes a process view of a juror's
education. By a process view of a juror's education, I mean a view that
recognizes that every stage at which the judge or court interacts with the
jurors creates an opportunity to educate the jurors. From start to finish-
from the jury summons to the jury verdict-there are opportunities for
the court to educate jurors as to their proper role. Informing jurors about
the dangers posed by the Internet and social media should not be limited
to a one-shot effort on the part of the court, as is currently practiced in
many courtrooms today. Rather, courts need to view juror education as
an ongoing process. They need to make use of every stage and every
judge-jury or court-jury interaction, and view it as an opportunity to rein-
force the lesson that jurors must refrain from using the Internet and so-
cial media to communicate about the trial.
The education of a juror begins with the jury summons, which is the
prospective juror's first interaction with the court, and it ends when the
jury announces its verdict and the judge polls the jury about its verdict
and then dismisses the jury. If the summons and dismissal constitute the
two end points of a continuum, there are additional points of interaction
between court and juror throughout the process including the jury orien-
tation video, voir dire, oath, preliminary instructions, as-needed instruc-
tions, final instructions, visual reminders, juror questions, and possible
polling of the jury. Each of these junctures provides an opportunity for
the judge to educate jurors about their proper role and their need to re-
frain from using the Internet and social media to discuss or research the
trial.
A. THE JURY SUMMONS
When a citizen receives a jury summons in the mail, that event marks
the beginning of the jury process. Although summonses might vary in
form from state to state, in general they inform citizens when and where
they must report for jury duty and that they could receive an order to
show cause if they fail to appear.232 The summons provides some basic
information, like what to do if the recipient cannot report on the date and
place indicated on the summons. 233 The summons also contains a few ba-
sic questions, such as whether the recipient is a citizen 234 and meets the
232. See, e.g., Jury Summons from Office of the Clerk, Cent. Dist. of Ill., U.S. Court,
http://www.ilcd.uscourts.gov/sites/ilcd/files/JurorSummonsLetter.pdf (last visited Aug.
27, 2014).
233. Id.
234. The California Assembly wanted to make jury service available to noncitizens. See
California: Bill Would Allow Noncitizen Jurors, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 23, 2013, at A16 ("Cali-
fornia would become the first state to allow noncitizens who are in the country legally to bejurors under a bill that cleared the Assembly on Thursday[, Aug. 22, 2013)] and heads to
Gov. Jerry Brown's desk."). However, the governor vetoed the bill. See Patrick McGreevy
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age requirement. 235 These questions go to the recipient's fitness to serve
as a juror. Unless a recipient meets these two (at a minimum) threshold
eligibility requirements, he or she will not be able to serve as a juror.236
The summons also might include a brief questionnaire that the recipi-
ent is expected to complete and to bring to the Jury Assembly Room. The
Criminal Court in Cook County, Chicago, for example, asks the recipient
whether he or she has ever been the victim of a crime, has been a party in
a lawsuit, or has a family member or relative who has been a party in a
lawsuit. The questionnaire also asks the recipient's occupation, marital
status, and number of children.
The questionnaire attached to the jury summons also should include a
question about whether the recipient could adhere to the judge's instruc-
tion and refrain from using the Internet and social media to communicate
about the trial if seated on a jury. The questionnaire, by including such a
question, could start the process of educating the prospective juror about
the conduct that is appropriate for a juror. When people receive a jury
summons in the mail, their initial response is to think of reasons why they
are unable to serve. No time ever seems like a good time for jury duty.
For those who worry that the recipient might use this question as a way to
try to avoid jury duty, and therefore, might answer that he or she would
be unable to follow the instruction, the response would not be determina-
tive, just like the responses to any of the above questions (other than
eligibility requirements) are not determinative. The information provided
at this early stage is the basis for further questioning during voir dire. The
advantage to including a question about the Internet and social media at
this early point is to start the process of educating the prospective juror
about his or her responsibilities as a juror.
B. THE JUROR ORIENTATION VIDEO
The juror orientation video is the next opportunity that the court has to
educate prospective jurors about the need to refrain from using the In-
ternet and social media to communicate about the trial. Some states, such
as Massachusetts, 237 make their juror orientation video available on-
& Melanie Mason, Brown Vetoes Bill for Noncitizens To Serve on Juries; Move Runs
Counter to Governor's Recent Decisions That Expand Immigrant Rights, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
8, 2013, at Al ("Gov. Jerry Brown on Monday [Oct. 7, 2013] vetoed legislation that would
have made California the first state in the nation to allow legal immigrants who are not
citizens to serve on juries.").
235. Juror Questionnaire from Office of the Clerk, Cent. Dist. of Ill., U.S. Dist. Court,
http://www.ilcd.uscourts.gov/sites/ilcd/files/JurorQuestionnaire.pdf (last visited Aug. 27,
2014).
236. See, e.g., Office of the State Court Adm'r, Answers to Your Questions About Your
Colorado Jury System, COLO. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/File/
Media/Brochures/jurysystem(1).pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2014); What Should I Know
About Serving on a Jury?, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Public/Pamphlets/
JuryDuty.aspx (last visited Aug. 27, 2014).
237. See E-mail from Hannaford-Agor, supra note 230 (citing http://www.mass.gov/
courts/jury/index2.htm).
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line. 2 3 8 A viewer can go to the state court's website, look for the tab for
jurors, and click on the juror orientation video. This means that prospec-
tive jurors who want to start learning about jury duty can do so from the
comfort of their home. The Massachusetts online video, as mentioned
earlier, is one of the few online videos to include a segment about the
need for jurors to avoid communicating about the trial online.239 Other
states should follow Massachusetts's example and make their video avail-
able online as well as update their video so that it educates prospective
jurors on the need to avoid online communication about the trial.
The next opportunity for courts to convey this message occurs in the
Jury Assembly Room when prospective jurors are waiting to be called for
a panel. At this juncture, prospective jurors usually have a lot of time on
their hands. For example, when I was called for jury duty at the Criminal
Court in Cook County, Illinois, I, along with other prospective jurors, was
told to report to the Jury Assembly Room by 9:30 a.m. However, only a
few panels were called that morning. At noon, we were told to go have
lunch and return by 1:30 p.m. A little after 2:00 p.m., we were told we
were not needed and were dismissed. The only thing we were asked to do
in the almost five hours we were waiting was to watch a short juror orien-
tation video, which was quite well done. However, the video should in-
clude a segment on the need for jurors to avoid online communication
about the trial. This is a good time to educate prospective jurors, both
because they have time on their hands and because they could already be
sending e-mails about their jury experience, just as I was.
C. THE VOIR DIRE
The next stage in the process of educating jurors to avoid online com-
munication about the trial is during the voir dire. In federal court, the
judge usually conducts the voir dire 240 and the questions tend to be fairly
basic. 241 They focus on the prospective juror's occupation, marital status,
number of children, the occupation of the spouse and children, whether
the prospective juror knows any of the lawyers or parties, whether the
238. For a sample of states' juror orientation videos that inform jurors they cannot use
the Internet or social media to communicate about the trial, see Colorado Jury Service:
What to Expect, YouTUBE (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zNqt5NStkTY
(Colorado, with warning beginning at 9:09); Jury Orientation, MINN. JUD. BRANCH, http://
www.mncourts.gov/?page=1948 (last visited Aug. 27, 2014) (Minnesota, with warning be-
ginning at 10:37); STL Circuit Court's Channel, Reporting for Jury Duty, YouTUBE (Nov.
13, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KOjJhPgNOTc (St. Louis, Missouri, with
warning beginning at 1:25); Jury Orientation Video, N.H. JUD. BRANCH, http://www
.courts.nh.gov/SpecialSessions/mediaplayer2/Jury-Orientation-Video.html (last visited
Aug. 27, 2014) (New Hampshire, with warning beginning at 7:39). For another country's
approach to using the juror orientation video to address the topic of jurors and social
media, see Ministry of Justice UK, Your Role as a Juror, YouTUBE (Apr. 2, 2012), http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=JP7slp-X9Pc (England).
239. See E-mail from Hannaford-Agor, supra note 230.
240. See FED R. Civ. P. 47(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a).
241. For a sample of a voir dire in federal court, see Torres Voir Dire, supra note 45
(transcript of jury selection).
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prospective juror has been the victim of a crime (in criminal cases) or
party to a lawsuit (in civil cases), and whether there is any reason that the
prospective juror cannot be impartial. 242 Judges usually ask the lawyers if
there are any additional questions that they would like the judge to
ask.2 4 3 Just before this point, the judge could also ask a question about
the prospective juror's willingness to follow the judge's instruction and to
avoid communicating about the trial using the Internet or social media.
This question should be asked individually of each prospective juror, just
as the judge asks each prospective juror about his or her occupation or
whether the prospective juror knows any of the trial participants. It is
important that each prospective juror is required to give a response. As
one trial judge has observed, if the jury is questioned as a group, it is easy
for jurors to remain silent even when the questions apply to them, and
they ought to respond.244 However, if each prospective juror is asked in-
dividually then silence is not an option and a response must be
forthcoming.
Some trial judges already use voir dire to ask jurors whether they can
follow the judge's instruction to refrain from communicating online about
the trial, but it is important that this question, and any necessary follow-
up questions, becomes part of standard practice by all trial judges, federal
and state, and not just by a maverick few.2 4 5 The voir dire is an important
stage in the education of a juror. It is a moment of transformation: citi-
zens stop searching for excuses why they cannot serve and start embrac-
ing their new role. They want to perform their role as best they can. At
this point, the judge should ask whether the prospective juror can adhere
to the judge's instruction to avoid using the Internet and social media to
communicate about the trial. The prospective juror is making a public
commitment in open court before the judge, parties, public, and fellow
jurors that he or she will follow the judge's instruction about forgoing
online communication about the trial.
Voir dire also provides the judge and lawyers the opportunity for fur-
ther questioning of any prospective juror who seems reluctant or con-
fused about what forgoing online communication might entail.246 When a
prospective juror hesitates to answer the judge's question, that hesitation
provides an opening for follow-up questions. It gives the judge an oppor-
tunity to remind the prospective juror that his or her words are being
242. See id.
243. See FED. R. Civ. P. 47(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a).
244. See Gregory E. Mize, On Better Jury Selection: Spotting UFO Jurors Before They
Enter the Jury Room, CT. REv., Spring 1999, at 10, 12.
245. See supra Part V.D (describing maverick judges).
246. See, e.g., Paul Mark Sandler, Keeping Jurors Offline, NAT'L L.J. (May 23, 2011),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202494641739/Keeping-jurors-offline ("Counsel
should use voir dire to help weed out potential jurors who may be unable or unwilling to
pull the plug on their Web browsers for the duration of a trial. In jurisdictions where attor-
neys submit voir dire questions in advance for the judge to read to potential jurors, attor-
neys should include questions that educate would-be jurors about the rules of the road: no
independent computer research, no blogging about the case and no Facebook excursions to
read about the lawyers, parties or witnesses.").
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taken down by the court reporter and going on the record and that the
prospective juror, if chosen to serve on the jury, will soon have to take an
oath, attesting to his or her ability to decide the case based only on the
evidence presented in the courtroom. This colloquy also gives the lawyers
a chance to determine whether they will use any of their peremptory
challenges to remove a prospective juror who does not seem willing or
able to live up to the requirements of being a juror.
D. THE OATH
Prospective jurors who have said that they could follow the law and
could be impartial, and who have not been removed by for cause or per-
emptory challenges, take an oath before they assume their role as jurors.
Although the oath can vary from state to state, a typical oath is as fol-
lows: "You and each of you, do solemnly swear that you will well and
truly try the cause now pending before this Court, and a true verdict
render therein, according to the evidence and the instructions of the
Court, so help you God?" 247 The jurors take this oath while standing in
the jury box in the presence of the public, parties, lawyers, and judge.
The oath is another juncture at which to educate the jurors about their
obligation to avoid online communication about the trial. This could be
done by the judge before the jurors take the oath. The judge could re-
mind the jurors that they are about to swear (or affirm) to decide the case
based only on the evidence and in accordance with the instructions pro-
vided by the judge. To decide the case based only on "the evidence," they
must turn a blind eye to information about the trial outside of the court-
room, including information available online. To decide the case accord-
ing to "the instructions of the Court," they must also follow the
instruction that they avoid online communication about the trial. In addi-
tion (or alternatively), the oath could be altered slightly to make these
points more explicit. The oath could be revised so that jurors solemnly
swear to the following: "You and each of you, do solemnly swear that you
will well and truly try the cause now pending before this Court, and a true
verdict render therein, according only to the evidence presented in this
courtroom and the instructions of the Court, so help you God?" 248
Throughout the trial, the judge would then be able to remind the jurors
not only of the judge's instructions but also of the oath that each juror
swore to uphold.
247. CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL TRIAL JUDGES' DESKBOOK, Supra note
27, at 356. Michigan has a similar oath:
Each of you do solemnly swear (or affirm) that, in this action now before the
court, you will justly decide the questions submitted to you, that, unless you
are discharged by the court from further deliberation, you will render a true
verdict, and that you will render your verdict only on the evidence intro-
duced and in accordance with the instructions of the court, so help you God.
MICH. CRT R. 2.511(4)(1) (2014) (Oath).
248. I have used California's oath as my model. See supra text accompanying note 247.




Judges' cautionary instructions at the beginning of a trial provide an
important juncture at which the judge can continue the jurors' education
by explaining to them the importance of avoiding online communication
about the trial. Judges in the federal judiciary and a number of state judi-
ciaries have recognized the importance of updating the cautionary in-
struction so that it specifically mentions the Internet and social media
that jurors must avoid. 249 In addition to specificity, the cautionary instruc-
tion should also do the following: provide an explanation so that jurors
understand the reasons for the prohibition; ask jurors to self-police; and
inform them about the consequences of failing to abide by the instruc-
tion. The instruction should be given at the beginning and end of the trial
and repeated before and after any recesses so that jurors remember and
adhere to the instruction throughout the entire trial.
1. The Content of the Instruction
Instructions requiring jurors to refrain from using the Internet and so-
cial media to find information or to share views about the trial need to
include an explanation as to why it is so important that jurors exercise
such restraint. Jurors are being asked to refrain from an activity that has
become second nature to them. For some jurors, this is a departure from
their ordinary conduct; for other jurors, it is a challenge but one that they
are willing to meet. In either case, they need to know why they must
refrain from an activity that seems so innocuous and commonplace to
them. Without an explanation, the court seems to be imposing an arbi-
trary restriction. With an explanation, however, jurors begin to under-
stand why they must rely only on the evidence presented in the
courtroom and discuss it only with their fellow jurors during jury deliber-
ations. With an explanation, they are more likely to adhere to the instruc-
tion.250 As social science research has demonstrated, "compliance can be
measurably increased by simply adding the word 'because' and some type
of explanation." 2 5 1 In addition, an explanation treats jurors more respect-
fully than a mere prohibition and sets a tone of respect for jurors and
their role that most judges try to maintain throughout the entire trial
process.
States are beginning to include explanations in their cautionary instruc-
tion. Ohio, for example, tells jurors:
You are required to decide this case based solely on the evidence
that is presented to you in this courtroom. It is my role as the judge
249. See supra Part V.A.
250. Most of the jurors in the 2014 study conducted in the courtrooms of Judges St. Eve
and Burns indicated that they resisted the temptation to engage in online communication
because of the judge's instruction and because of the oath they had taken. See St. Eve,
Burns & Zuckerman, supra note 156, at 80-82.
251. Susan MacPherson & Beth Bonora, The Wired Juror, Unplugged, TRIAL, Nov.
2010, at 40, 42.
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to determine what evidence is admissible and what is not admissible.
It would be a violation of your duties, and unfair to the parties, if you
should obtain other information about the case, which might be in-
formation that is not admissible as evidence.252
In a similar vein, Illinois explains:
The reason for these instructions is that your verdict must be based
only on the evidence presented in this courtroom and the law I [will
provide] [have provided] to you in my instructions. It would be un-
fair to the parties and a violation of your oath to base your decision
on information from outside this courtroom. 253
Although both these explanations could be more expansive, at least they
provide jurors with some reasons why they must abide by the instruction.
It is also important that the cautionary instruction tell jurors what ac-
tion they should take if they see a fellow juror violating the instruction.
After all, as one empirical study showed, judges tend to learn about viola-
tions primarily from other jurors.254 Although there is the danger that
jurors might feel like they are being asked to spy on each other, with so
much at stake jurors need to understand that this is a serious matter and
their cooperation is needed. The instruction can put it as succinctly as
possible. For example, Illinois tells jurors: "If you become aware of any
violation of these instructions, it is your legal duty to report this to me
immediately." 2 5 5
In addition, the instruction should tell jurors about the consequences
that can follow from a violation. Some states explain to jurors that a vio-
lation could lead to a mistrial, which could require a retrial that will be at
the taxpayers' expense.256 Other states explain that jurors could face con-
tempt proceedings and fines.2 5 7 Ohio informs jurors of both
consequences:
You should know that if this Admonition is violated, there could be a
mistrial.... This can lead to a great deal of expense for the parties
and for the taxpayers, namely you and your neighbors. . . . If a mis-
trial were to be declared based on a violation of this Admonition, the
juror responsible could be required to pay the cost of the first trial,
and could also be punished for contempt of court.258
Illinois's instruction is more circumspect about the consequences: "Dis-
obeying these instructions could cause a mistrial, meaning all of our ef-
forts have been wasted and we would have to start over again with a new
252. OSBA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 211, § I.C.1.
253. 2011 IPI, supra note 33, § 1.01 [11] (the brackets leave it to the judge to decide
which phrase is applicable).
254. See Dunn, supra note 130, at 4.
255. 2011 IPI, supra note 33, § 1.01 [11].
256. See Eric P. Robinson, Jury Instructions for the Modern Age: A 50-State Survey of
Jury Instructions on Internet and Social Media, 1 REYNOLDS CTS. & MEDIA L.J. 307 (2011);
see, e.g., id. at 234 (Connecticut).
257. See, e.g., id. at 393 (Texas).
258. OSBA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 211, § I.C.5.
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trial. If you violate these instructions you could be found in contempt of
court. "259
The instruction should tell jurors what is at stake so that they recognize
that the consequences for them and for the community can be significant.
It is all too easy to justify one's behavior for going online. It is important
for jurors to know that there will be costs, both individual and societal.
The consequences of a violation seemed to affect the jurors in the survey
done by Judge St. Eve,260 even though the jurors might have told the
judge what they thought the judge wanted to hear.261 A number of jurors
in that study responded that they refrained from using social media to
discuss the trial because of the judge's instructions;262 a few said they did
so because they did not want to "get arrested" or go to "JAIL."263
2. The Timing of Instructions
The instruction needs to be given at the beginning and end of the trial
as well as every time there is a recess throughout the trial and delibera-
tions. Traditionally, the cautionary instruction was given at the beginning
of the trial or at the end of the trial before the jurors began their delibera-
tions.264 A movement in the 1990s sought to have judges give a prelimi-
nary instruction at the start of the trial so that jurors had some framework
into which to place the remainder of the trial and then give the final in-
structions either before closing argument or after it.2 65 Some judges also
gave instructions as needed throughout the trial.2 6 6
It is essential that the judge give the cautionary instruction about the
Internet and social media at the beginning and end of the trial and
throughout the trial. If the judge simply gives it at the end, the jurors
might have been going online throughout the trial. If the judge simply
gives it at the beginning, the jurors are likely to forget the admonition,
particularly if the trial is lengthy. However, if the judge gives it at the
beginning, end, and before and after any recesses, then the juror cannot
say he or she was unaware of it or forgot about it. As every teacher
knows, repetition is useful, and students absorb lessons at different
points. Thus, repetition of the cautionary instruction governing the In-
ternet and social media is critical. One federal district court judge even
goes so far as to ask the jurors every time they return from a recess
259. 2011 IPI, supra note 33, § 1.01 [12].
260. See St. Eve, Burns & Zuckerman, supra note 156, at 82-84.
261. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
262. St. Eve, Burns & Zuckerman, supra note 156, at 80, 83.
263. Id. at 82 (capitals in original).
264. See Dann & Logan, supra note 60, at 281.
265. See, e.g., id. at 281, 283.
266. See, e.g., AM. JURY PROJECT, AM. BAR Ass'N., PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY
TRIALS princ. 13.D.2 (2005) (calling for judges to instruct jurors "[w]hen necessary to the
jurors' proper understanding of the proceedings"); Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instruc-
tions into the Twenty-First Century, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 449, 499 (2006).
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whether they have continued to abide by the cautionary instruction. 267
Moreover, he asks for a show of hands-an affirmative act by the ju-
rors-indicating that they have continued to abide by his instruction dur-
ing the break.268 This is a useful approach and one that other judges
should emulate.
F. VISUAL REMINDERS
A juror's education is ongoing even when the juror is not in the court-
room. The message of the cautionary instruction-to avoid online com-
munications about the trial-can reach beyond the courtroom when the
court uses posters, brochures, notices, or cards as reminders.
Educators have described how some people learn best from listening
and others by reading; some learn best through words and others through
images. A poster in the jury room, where jurors spend a lot of time, is one
way of conveying a lesson through words and images. The poster can re-
inforce the words spoken by the judge in the courtroom and remind ju-
rors about avoiding online communication even when jurors are outside
the presence of the judge. The court can also display these posters in the
Jury Assembly Room, where prospective jurors also spend a lot of time.
The poster commissioned by the Washington State Judiciary, and later
adopted by some of the federal district courts, is one example of images
and words that reinforce each other and that remind jurors to avoid com-
municating about the trial using the Internet and social media. 269 The
poster, measuring twenty by twenty-four inches, is in the shape of a giant
cell phone.270 Although it contains a fair amount of text for a poster, it
highlights three basic rules, which appear in large-size font, in capital let-
ters, and in a different color than the rest of the text.
Another visual reminder that courts in England considered using was a
card containing jurors' rights and responsibilities, including their respon-
sibility to avoid the Internet and social media. 271 The idea was that jurors
could carry the card with them wherever they went-whether to the jury
room, their home, or any other location. Jurors, by having the card in
their pocket, alongside their cell phone, would have a constant reminder,
even when they were not under the gaze of the judge. Although the card
has not yet been implemented, some English judges distribute a jury no-
tice that performs the same function. 272 The High Court of Justice,
Queen's Bench Division, in England is considering "whether to recom-
267. Chief Judge James F. Holderman, from the Northern District of Illinois, explained
at the Allerton Conference that this was his practice and that he found it to be effective.
See Allerton Conference Panel Discussion, supra note 218.
268. Id.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 227-29.
270. See E-mail from Neidhardt, supra note 228 (providing .pdf of poster).
271. See Thomas, supra note 101, at 50 (suggesting that courts in England and Wales
provide jurors with written juror guidelines that they keep with them throughout the trial
and that include instructions on why they must not use the Internet to seek or share infor-
mation about the trial).
272. Att'y Gen. v. Davey, [2013] EWHC (Admin) 2317, Q.B. 348 [11], [13], [59] (Eng.).
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mend that the practice [of handing the jury a notice] should be univer-
sally followed." 273
When the jury is about to deliberate, some courts distribute a brochure
prepared by the American Judicature Society (AJS) entitled Behind
Closed Doors: A Guide for Jury Deliberations, which provides jurors with
basic information about how to conduct their jury deliberations. 274 Al-
though it is up to jurors to decide how to organize their deliberations, this
brochure offers suggestions and provides background information about
jury deliberations. 275 The AJS brochure could include a reminder to ju-
rors about avoiding the Internet and social media during deliberations.
This is another opportunity to reinforce the message, and this time the
message would be coming from an outside source. The brochure is short,
clear, and easy to read. It could provide another way to remind jurors
about the need to avoid online communication, particularly when they
are in the jury room and beyond the watch of the judge and lawyers.
G. JUROR QUESTIONS
Some state276 and federal courts277 give jurors the opportunity to sub-
mit questions to witnesses, which provides another way for the court to
reinforce the message to jurors about avoiding online communications
about the trial.2 7 8 When a judge explains the procedure that jurors need
to follow to submit written questions for witnesses, the judge also can
273. Id. at [61].
274. See generally AM. JUDICATURE Soc'v, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: A GUIDE FOR
JURY DELIBERATIONS (1999) (providing jurors with general information about jury
deliberations).
275. See id.
276. The practice [of juror questions] is mandated for criminal trials in three
states [Arizona, Colorado, and Indiana], prohibited by case law in [six] states
[Arkansas, Georgia, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Texas], and left
to the sound discretion of the trial court in the rest. In civil trials, juror ques-
tions are mandated in six states [Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Wash-
ington, and Wyoming], prohibited in 10 states [Minnesota, Nebraska, Texas,
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
and possibly Georgia], and left to the discretion of the trial judge in the rest.
Gregory E. Mize & Paula Hannaford-Agor, Jury Trial Innovations Across America: How
We Are Teaching and Learning from Each Other, 1 J. CT. INNOVATION 189, 214 (2008). In
2012, Illinois provided, by rule, that in civil trials jurors could ask questions, though the
judge still has discretion whether to permit the practice in any given case. See ILL. S. Or. R.
243; ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES, ILLI.
NOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 1.07 [15] & Comment [15] (2013-2014) (pro-
viding instructions and procedures to implement ILL. S. CT. R. 243).
277. See, e.g., Bruce Pfaff, John L. Stalmack & Nancy S. Marder, The Right to Submit
Questions to Witnesses, CBA REC., May 2009, at 36, 39-41 (providing a survey of state
court decisions and federal courts of appeals decisions indicating jurisdictions that permit
juror questions).
278. See Nancy S. Marder, Answering Jurors' Questions: Next Steps in Illinois, 41 Lov.
U. CHI. L.J. 727, 746 (2010) ("[A]nother way to address this tendency [of jurors doing
online research] is to permit jurors to ask their questions in court. If they ask their ques-
tions in court, then they will have less need to seek information from outside sources.");
Ellen Brickman et al., How Juror Internet Use Has Changed the American Jury Trial, 1 J.
Or. INNOVATION 287, 298-99 (2008) ("Finally, allowing jurors to submit questions to wit-
nesses can provide another outlet for their curiosity or confusion. This too may help to
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explain that this is the appropriate way for jurors to have their questions
answered. Through this process, jurors can obtain information or clarifi-
cation that they believe is important to their decision-making. 279 The
judge should explain to jurors that they can ask questions as long as they
follow the procedures devised by the court; thus, there is no need for
them to take matters into their own hands and go online.
Most courts that allow jurors to submit written questions to witnesses
follow similar procedures. After a witness is done testifying and about to
leave the stand, the judge can ask jurors to submit, in writing and without
identifying themselves by name or juror number, any questions they have
for that witness before he or she steps down. 280 Typically, the judge re-
views the questions with the lawyers and determines which questions can
be asked.281 If a question can be asked, then the judge will ask it of the
witness. If a question cannot be asked, the judge will explain to the jury
that some questions cannot be asked for legal reasons, and they should
not take it personally. 282 Most jurors understand this.2 8 3 The lawyers then
have an opportunity for further questioning of the witness.
Giving jurors the opportunity to ask questions of witnesses could help
jurors resist the temptation to do research online. At the very least, juror
prevent jurors from conducting Internet research on material they hear in the
courtroom.").
279. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Questions During Trial: A Window
into Juror Thinking, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1927, 1931 (2006) (using videotaped deliberations
to see how jurors made use of their questions during deliberations and finding that they
used them not only "to clarify the testimony of witnesses and to fill in gaps, but also to
assist in evaluating the credibility of witnesses and the plausibility of accounts offered dur-
ing trial through a process of cross-checking"); Nicole L. Mott, The Current Debate on
Juror Questions: "To Ask or Not To Ask, That Is the Question," 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1099, 1115-16, 1118-19 (2003) (describing the results of an empirical study examining the
kinds of questions jurors asked, which tended to focus on understanding the words the
witness used, the procedures the witness followed, and the facts that jurors thought should
have been addressed but were not); Eugene A. Lucci, The Case for Allowing Jurors to
Submit Written Questions, 89 JUDICATURE 16, 17-18 (2005).
280. See, e.g., JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONs 260 (G. Thomas Munsterman, Paula L. Han-
naford & G. Marc Whitehead eds., 1997) (providing a sample instruction entitled "Ques-
tions by Jurors"). The judge can have the jurors pass their written questions to the bailiff
before the witness steps down or give the questions to the bailiff during a recess. See id.
Some judges have the jurors return to the jury room before writing down their questions
there. See Hon. Warren D. Wolfson, An Experiment in Juror Interrogation of Witnesses,
CBA REc., Feb. 1987, at 12, 14. Although there are some variations on when and where
the jurors write down their questions, the questions are always in writing, without jurors'
names or numbers, and submitted in a manner that is not disruptive or time-consuming.
See, e.g., id.
281. See JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 280, at 260.
282. See id. ("Keep in mind, however, that the rules of evidence or other rules of law
may prevent some of your questions from being answered.... The failure to ask a question
is not a reflection on the person asking it.").
283. See Larry Heurer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation in Trials
Through Note Taking and Question Asking, 79 JUDICATURE 256, 256, 260 (1996) (finding
that in a study of 67 Wisconsin state court trials and in a national study with 160 trials, in
which jurors were permitted to ask questions in 71 of the trials, jurors understood why
their questions were not asked and were not angry when this happened).
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questions are a way for judges to show that courts are responsive 284 and
want jurors to have the information they believe they need to do their job
effectively. 285 This opportunity for jurors to ask their questions in court
should help to forestall jurors' attempts to find this information on their
own using the Internet or social media.
H. THE POLLING OF THE JURY
The polling of the jury is the last time for courts to reinforce the lesson
that jurors should not have used the Internet or social media to communi-
cate about the trial. After the jury has reached its verdict, it returns to the
courtroom so the verdict can be announced in open court. In a federal
criminal case, either party can request that the judge poll the jurors to
ensure that each juror agrees with the verdict.286
At this juncture, as the judge asks each juror to state in open court and
on the record whether he or she is in accord with the verdict, 287 the judge
could also ask whether the juror reached that verdict without resorting to
online communication. There might be a more subtle way of framing the
question, such as: "Is this your verdict that you reached based only on the
evidence presented in the courtroom?" Although judges might be more
comfortable with this language-which after all reflects the language that
jurors used when they took their oath-it is less direct. Jurors might not
make the connection between deciding the case based only on the evi-
dence presented in the courtroom and having engaged in online commu-
nication about the trial during the trial.
In addition, federal judges in criminal cases could instruct jurors at the
beginning of the trial, when they deliver their cautionary instruction
about not using the Internet and social media, that they might be polled
at the end of the trial and asked to say whether they reached their verdict
without consulting the Internet and social media. Judges would be correct
in saying that jurors "might be polled" because it is up to the attorneys or
to the judge to request the polling of jurors. Meanwhile, jurors would be
on notice that they could be asked in open court when the verdict is an-
nounced whether they abided by the judge's cautionary instruction. It
might be that just the possibility of being asked in open court at the end
of the trial-even if they are not actually asked-is sufficient to keep
them from engaging in any misconduct. Just like the law student who
does her reading because the professor has told her that she might be
called on in class the next day or the high school student who reviews the
math assignment because the teacher has said that there might be a quiz
284. See Anthony J. Ferrara, Lessons Learned from Jurors' Questions About Evidence
During Trial, 1 J. CT. INNOVATION 329, 341 (2008) ("In sum, we should pay special atten-
tion to what jurors say and respond to their concerns. What better way is there than al-
lowing them to ask questions?").
285. One judge instructs jurors that they should only ask a question if they "believe the
answer would be important to you as a juror in this case." Wolfson, supra note 280, at 14.
286. See FED. R. CluM. P. 31(d).
287. See id.
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the next day, the possibility of being polled in open court and asked
about any violations of the juror's oath or the judge's instruction might
elicit the correct behavior regardless of whether the juror is actually
polled.
I. PUNITIVE MEASURES
For the juror who has engaged in misconduct and has done research or
communicated online in a way that is prejudicial, there is always removal
and punishment. Although this approach is after the fact, it might serve
an educational function for jurors in future trials. These extreme cases
receive extensive coverage in the media, which might deter future
misconduct.
Not all states have had experience with jurors who violated the cau-
tionary instruction and their oath and who went online to conduct re-
search or to express their views about the trial, but the judges who have
had to confront such cases have taken a number of steps. They have re-
moved the offending juror from the jury and have sometimes held con-
tempt hearings, the results of which have been fines, an essay, or in rare
cases, jail time.288
Although these cases are extreme, they garner a lot of attention in the
media. As a result, they serve as lessons to future jurors. As Judge St.
Eve's survey revealed, jurors are loath to "end up in jail" for violating the
judge's instructions. 289 Accordingly, these extreme cases might promote
general awareness of the problem and inspire jurors to behave correctly
even if they were not persuaded by the instructions or their oath. The
image of the juror being marched off to jail is not one that other citizens
are likely to forget.
VII. ANTICIPATING RESPONSES
In this Part, I anticipate some of the responses to my proposal urging
courts to take a process view of a juror's education. Responses will vary
according to roles. I anticipate two types of responses from jurors. For
"the uninformed juror," who is unaware that online communication
about the trial is prohibited, the process view of educating a juror at
every step of the jury process will be helpful. For "the recalcitrant juror,"
who knows about the prohibition but is unwilling to abide by it, this pro-
posal will have little or no effect. However, lawyers and judges should try
to identify and remove this type of juror during voir dire. Judges should
be supportive of this proposal even though it requires repetition on their
part because a fair trial is at stake. Some jury scholars who regard jurors
who use the Internet and social media as a new breed of "active jurors"
might resist this proposal, but if they do, it is because they take the notion
of an active juror further than the Constitution permits.
288. See Dunn, supra note 130, at 5; White, supra note 220.




1. The Uninformed Juror
The uninformed juror will appreciate the ongoing education that a pro-
cess view provides. The uninformed juror is one who does not know that
online communication is prohibited. For example, the uninformed juror
hears the judge give a traditional cautionary instruction that tells jurors
not to do outside research, but does not make the connection between
"outside research" and a quick Google search or a glimpse at Wikipedia.
Similarly, the uninformed juror does not understand that the traditional
cautionary instruction, informing jurors not to discuss the trial with
friends or family, also includes not posting one's impressions of the trial
on Facebook or not "friending" any of the trial participants.
This disjuncture between what the court thinks it has prohibited and
what the juror thinks the court has prohibited can be resolved by having
the court repeat the message in a variety of ways and at a variety of
points so that there can be no misunderstanding and no opportunity for
the juror to forget. If such a juror is told at every stage of the jury process
that online communication about the trial is prohibited, then the unin-
formed juror will grasp the lesson and comply. The uninformed juror will
eventually become an informed juror. It may happen at different points
for different jurors, but it will happen. The direct language will bring
home the point, and the reminders at every stage of the jury process will
ensure that the juror abides by the prohibition throughout the length of
the trial and deliberations. Thus, the uninformed juror will appreciate the
process view because it seeks to make clear what is prohibited in a way
that the traditional instruction alone fails to do.
2. The Recalcitrant Juror
The recalcitrant juror, even if he or she receives the same education as
the uninformed juror, will still not abide by the lesson being taught. Such
a juror cannot be educated by the court. Whereas the uninformed juror
does not at first understand the extent of the prohibition, the recalcitrant
juror understands what the prohibition includes but refuses to abide by it.
This response can be for any number of reasons, such as the juror does
not see the harm in communicating online about the trial, does not wish
to be deprived of communicating online for the length of the trial, or is
addicted to online communication and cannot stop it anymore than he or
she can stop breathing. The best hope is to identify and remove such a
juror early in the jury process.
The best opportunity for finding recalcitrant jurors and removing them
is during voir dire. If the voir dire questions include asking prospective
jurors whether they can abide by the cautionary instruction and having
them respond individually, then any hesitation on their part-whether
communicated through words or body language-can be followed up
with further questioning. Judge Gregory Mize wrote about the challenge
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of spotting "UFO jurors" during voir dire and recommended questioning
all prospective jurors as a group and then individually so that silence was
not an option and each had to speak, with the hope that each prospective
juror would speak candidly.290 His suggestion is a good one, but judges
have resisted it perhaps because they worry about adding to the length of
voir dire. Even if a judge did not question all prospective jurors individu-
ally in the robing room, as Judge Mize suggested, they should question
individually those whom the judge or lawyer suspects of being recalci-
trant jurors. Further questioning could be done in the judge's robing
room, with the court reporter and lawyers present, but not with fellow
prospective jurors or members of the public present. The recalcitrant ju-
ror might be more willing to speak candidly in the more private setting of
the robing room and acknowledge his or her unwillingness to abide by
the cautionary instruction. This is a difficult thing to do because it runs
counter to the social norm of saying that one can follow the judge's in-
structions. Thus, the more intimate setting of the robing room might help
the recalcitrant juror acknowledge his or her unwillingness to follow the
instructions. The goal is to winnow out such jurors before they are seated
on a jury.
If the recalcitrant juror gets through voir dire and is seated on the jury,
then he or she could still be removed at a later stage through the self-
policing that other jurors have been asked to do. It might be that another
juror spots the recalcitrant juror doing Google searches and follows the
judge's instruction to notify the judge. At least one study found that fel-
low jurors are more likely than judges to spot jurors who violate the pro-
hibition. 291 Depending upon what the recalcitrant juror has shared with
his fellow jurors and how material it is to the trial, the judge might be
able to remove the recalcitrant juror and replace him or her with an
alternate.
Taking a process view of a juror's education will not convert the recal-
citrant juror into an instruction-abiding juror; however, it will provide
several opportunities to remove that juror before a verdict has been
reached. From the jury summons questionnaire that the prospective ju-
rors complete, to an extensive voir dire including individual questioning
about Internet and social media usage, to the oath that the jurors take, to
the many admonitions of the court, to the visual reminders, and perhaps
even to the polling of the jurors in open court, the recalcitrant juror will
be bombarded with the message that online communication about the
trial is not permitted. If all else fails, the recalcitrant juror can be pun-
ished and a mistrial declared if the recalcitrant juror's misconduct comes
to light. Although this is a costly result-and would be far less desirable
than identifying the recalcitrant juror early in the process-at the very
least, the option of punishment (through contempt, fines and even jail
time) serves as a lesson to future jurors. Perhaps it would even serve as a
290. Mize, supra note 244, at 11-12.
291. See Dunn, supra note 130, at 4.
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lesson to future recalcitrant jurors who might be willing to self-identify
during voir dire rather than to risk contempt and sanctions after a verdict.
B. JUDGES' RESPONSES
Judges should favor taking a process view of a juror's education be-
cause a fair trial is at stake. Admittedly, judges might not want to repeat
the message of avoiding online communication at so many different
stages in the jury process. They might think that the repetition is unneces-
sary and that jurors understand the prohibition from the start. They might
even worry about insulting the jurors through constant repetition. How-
ever, judges are in the best position to know what is at stake. They know
that the parties have a right to a fair trial and that it is the judge's job to
ensure that the trial has been fair. They also know that trials are lengthy
and expensive proceedings. It would not take much cost-benefit analysis
for judges to conclude that it is better for them to repeat their message at
a variety of points throughout the trial than to have to redo the trial, and
possibly even hold contempt hearings.
Moreover, there is flexibility and discretion built into this proposal.
The idea is for the court or judge to convey the message that jurors need
to avoid online communication about the trial at every stage of the jury
process, but it is up to the judge to decide how best to convey this mes-
sage. For example, judges could use their own words rather than a pattern
cautionary instruction as one jury consultant advised.292 Or they could
use the pattern cautionary instruction at the beginning and end of the
trial, but when they admonish the jury before or after a recess, they could
simply use their own words and be succinct. A judge could even explain
to the jurors that although the jurors might get tired of hearing the same
admonition, the judge recognizes how easy it is for a juror to slip and
make a mistake, and the jury's verdict is so important that the judge is
willing to risk boring the jurors rather than having them consider infor-
mation that they found online. The judge can decide to use a short form
of the admonition or to acknowledge the repetition. The main point is for
the judge to remind the jurors not to communicate online about the trial.
Judges also might find that they are uncomfortable with one particular
aspect of the proposal; if so, they can omit it while still taking a process
view of the jurors' education. For example, a judge might think it inap-
propriate to ask jurors about their online communications when they are
being polled about the verdict. A judge could decline to ask, "Is this your
verdict and is it based only on the evidence presented in the courtroom?"
rather than the standard question, "Is this your verdict?" but the judge
could still follow the overarching approach provided by this proposal.
This proposal tries to use every judge-jury or court-jury interaction as an
opportunity to educate the jurors, and it encourages judges and courts to
convey a message through a variety of forms-words, images, objects-
292. See Twittering in the Jury Box, supra note 224, at 13.
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but if any discrete part proves unworkable, it can simply be omitted. The
point is to take a broad, big-picture view of a juror's education and to see
that it is not a one-shot effort, but an ongoing process.
C. ACTIVE JUROR PROPONENTS' RESPONSES
In 1993, Judge Michael Dann challenged the long held view that jurors
were "passive" vessels into which judges and lawyers simply "poured"
information. 293 He urged lawyers, judges, and jury scholars to recognize
jurors as "active" learners who need to be engaged throughout the trial in
order to perform their role effectively. 294 His views about "active jurors"
inspired many of us to consider the tools that jurors need to focus on the
trial, to evaluate evidence, and to discuss it thoughtfully during delibera-
tions. Today, some scholars are asking whether Judge Dann's vision of
creating "active jurors" can best be embodied by jurors who are able to
communicate with each other online and even conduct their own online
research.295 I think these scholars take the concept of "active jurors" too
far-further than Judge Dann envisioned and further than the U.S. Con-
stitution permits-and risk creating "anarchic jurors." This is a problem
not just for the jury but also for the parties and their right to a fair trial.
These scholars would likely disagree with my proposal and suggest that
courts need to embrace, rather than to resist, the online world.
Caren Morrison in Jury 2.0 suggested that jurors who want to go online
are the new breed of "active jurors" and that courts should think of a way
to facilitate this rather than try to prevent it.296 She suggested that jurors
should be permitted to communicate online and "post comments in some
centralized, anonymous forum."297 She noted that digital natives are
likely to feel most comfortable sharing their views online.298 The young-
est jurors, who have grown up with laptops and the Internet, are accus-
tomed to organizing their thoughts and sharing their views online. She
suggested that courts permit jurors to communicate online "[slo long as
the jurors did not specifically identify the case they were involved
with."299 In this way, "they could describe their impressions and express
their feelings in a controlled environment."30 0
I have several concerns with her proposal. One concern is that online
communication is more open to misunderstandings than face-to-face con-
versation and seems to inspire people to say things that they do not al-
ways mean. Jurors would be no exception. Those jurors who post online
comments, even in "some centralized, anonymous forum," might express
293. See B. Michael Dann, "Learning Lessons" and "Speaking Rights": Creating Edu-
cated and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1229-31, 1240-41 (1993).
294. Id. at 1241.
295. See, e.g., Caren Myers Morrison, Jury 2.0, 62 HASTINGs L.J. 1579, 1579 (2011).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1631.
298. See id. at 1630-31.




views that they would never have expressed to their fellow jurors other-
wise. Anonymous postings are particularly likely to lead jurors to say
things they would not say if their names were attached to the comments.
After all, having to deliberate face-to-face requires some self-censorship,
and this can be very useful especially when a diverse group of jurors must
reach a consensus. Moreover, if jurors are posting online comments
throughout the trial, then there exists the possibility that they will be-
come more fixed in their views than if they did not write anything at all.
As Morrison acknowledges, one of the dangers of jurors engaging in
predeliberation discussions is that their opinions might "solidify[ ] .
before all the evidence is in";301 the same danger is present even if they
are posting their views to a "centralized, anonymous forum." There is
also the danger that attorneys will try to find out what jurors are posting.
There is the further danger that jurors who post on "some centralized,
anonymous forum" might not limit themselves to that forum. Once they
go online, there might be no stopping point. It might be easier for jurors
to refrain altogether from online communication about the trial than to
refrain just a little bit-like the person who imbibes too much alcohol as
a daily practice and finds it easier to abstain altogether than to try to
engage in modest social drinking. Judges would undoubtedly find it diffi-
cult to tell jurors that they could post their views online in a central fo-
rum, but could not post their views online anywhere else.
Finally, we still live in a world with a digital divide. Not everyone feels
comfortable going online and even using computers. Morrison's proposal
fails to take into account those jurors who are not comfortable communi-
cating online because they have had little experience with it, whether be-
cause of their age, class, education, or race. Although the digital divide is
likely to change, it is unlikely to disappear in the immediate future. As
Judge St. Eve and her coauthors found in their second study, "not every
juror is a user." 302 A "centralized, anonymous forum" for jurors is likely
to exacerbate the current digital divide and to create a divide among ju-
rors serving on a jury that might otherwise not exist.
The proposal made by Gareth Lacy in Should Jurors Use the Internet?
went even further toward embracing the online world.303 In an early on-
line piece, Lacy suggested that online communication has become so
prevalent that resisting it is hopeless. 304 A court's effort to keep jurors
-from doing their own research online is doomed to fail.305 According to
Lacy, it is a battle that courts cannot win, and the sooner they recognize
this fact, the better.306 Moreover, in Lacy's view, jurors' online research
301. Id.
302. St. Eve, Burns & Zuckerman, supra note 156, at 85.
303. Gareth S. Lacy, Should Jurors Use the Internet? (May 5, 2010 unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1600585.
304. See id. at 1-2.
305. See id. at 7.
306. See id.
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might not be so bad.3 07 He is sympathetic to jurors' quest to have more
information so that they can make informed decisions.308 He takes the
view that we need to "add some technology to this civics classroom" 309
experience that Alexis de Tocqueville extolled when he wrote about the
jury as a "free school." 310 In a later published piece, Lacy backed away
from this position.311 Instead, he urged judges and lawyers to educate
themselves about online trial-related information so that they can better
know, evaluate, and respond to the material jurors might be reading.312
Lacy argued that it is time for courts to update the tools that jurors can
use including online research.313
I agree with Lacy that it is a difficult battle for courts, but I think it is
one that courts must fight. Although I have long been in favor of givingjurors the tools they need to perform their job well,3 14 online research
compromises the fairness of the trial and the impartiality of the jury. If
jurors can find their own information on the Internet and consider it no
matter how unreliable, mistaken, or prejudicial it might be, then the right
to a fair trial is doomed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The ease with which we can communicate online is growing rapidly,
and the question is whether courts and judges can persuade jurors to re-
sist the siren call of online communication when they serve as jurors.
Even though we do not know the full extent of the problem, ignoring it,
as some judges are wont to do, does not seem wise, particularly when the
fairness of a jury trial is at stake.
Many state and federal judges have recognized the need to take some
action, but usually that action is limited to a one-time admonition either
at the beginning or end of the trial. Although this is a step in the right
direction, it is only a step. What is needed is an ongoing approach that
looks at every interaction between judge and jury-from jury summons
to jury verdict-as an opportunity to educate jurors about the importance
of refraining from communicating online about the trial. If jurors under-
stand why the prohibition is so important and if they are reminded at
every stage of the trial process using a variety of methods, then it is likely
307. See id. at 4-6.
308. See id. at 1-2.
309. Id. at 9.
310. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270-76 (J.P. Mayer ed. &
George Lawrence trans., Doubleday & Co. 1969) (13th ed. 1850).
311. See Gareth S. Lacy, Untangling the Web: How Courts Should Respond to Juries
Using the Internet for Research, 1 REYNOLDS CTS. & MEDIA L.J. 169 (2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1765002.
312. See id. at 189-94.
313. See id. at 194-95.
314. See, e.g., Marder, supra note 266, at 499-505 (describing tools to help jurors under-
stand the judge's instructions); Nancy S. Marder, Juries and Technology: Equipping Jurorsfor the Twenty-First Century, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1257, 1273-80 (2001) (describing tools and
technology to aid jurors perform their role).
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that they will abide by it. This approach should transform uninformed
jurors into informed jurors. Admittedly, it will not reach recalcitrant ju-
rors. For recalcitrant jurors, who have no intention of following the prohi-
bition, the best hope is for judges and lawyers to spot them early and to
remove them from the jury as soon as possible. Only by taking a process
view of a juror's education do courts stand a chance of protecting a
party's constitutional right to a fair trial.
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